Liminal Lives at the Edges: Cross-Border Mobility and Settlement of Sangir-Talauds in Southeastern Philippines

A sub-thesis submitted in
fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts (Asian Studies)

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DECLARATION

I, Misael Racines, declare that this sub-thesis, submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Asian Studies) at the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. This sub-thesis has not been submitted for qualifications at any other institution.



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Abstract

The study examines the socio-historical dynamics of the border region between the Philippines and Indonesia. These dynamics are viewed, in particular, on the experiences and history of the Sangir-Talauds whose personal and community histories traverse both sides of the border. The study addresses the questions: how did the construction of the modern nation-state and border redefine the dynamics and locations of people within a border region? How were the barriers erected as result of nation-building used, manipulated, contested, and challenged by people in the border region? How did such acts shape and give meaning to border spaces?

The study shows that the formation of nation-states and construction of borders redefined the space and place of communities at the border region. Historically, the Sangir-Talauds were settlers of Southeastern Mindanao but with the colonial formation of states they were excluded from Mindanao and became officially part of Indonesia. The existence of the border did not prevent them, however, from building lives on both sides of the line. They crossed and re-crossed the border to make a living, find employment, and exploit the resources the border offers. The weak presence of the Philippine state in its border regions with Indonesia made the border even more imaginary and artificial.

Contrary to statist perceptions of borders as sites of control and closure, this study shows that they are also sites of interactions, exchanges, and accommodation. Border communities, aside from the state, are also critical actors in (re)defining the meaning and significance of the border.

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Chapter I

Introduction

This study argues that the formation of nation-states and construction of borders in Southeast Asia have led to the dislocation, exclusion, and suppression to varying degrees of communities straddling border regions of states. The territorial subdivision of communal spaces at the boundaries between states has also redefined and concealed the movements, affinities, and histories that mark these spaces. Border communities, however, have not been passive recipients of these processes. The persistence of cross-border interactions and movements not only resists and challenges the hegemony of states over these spaces, but more so, exposes the limitations of the notion of bounded collectivities. This study tests these propositions by examining the case of the maritime border region between the Philippines and Indonesia. From a pre-colonial center of trade and exchange, the area was transformed into the 'frontiers' of colonial and postcolonial states. The impact of this transformation is viewed, in particular, on the history of the Sangir-Talauds, an indigenous group now classified as part of Indonesia but whose history and lives navigate both sides of the border. This study will attempt to address the following questions: how did the construction of the modern nation-state and border redefine the dynamics and locations of people within a border region? How were the barriers erected as result of nation-building used, manipulated, contested, and challenged by people in the border region? How did such acts shape and give meaning to border spaces?

A key feature of the resurgence in boundary studies across disciplines beginning in the 1990s is the reappraisal of state-centered analytic frameworks in explaining cross-border population movements and

the border itself (Baud & van Schendel, 1997; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Wilson & Donnan, 1998; Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999; van Schendel & Itty, 2005; Horstmann & Wadley, 2006;[1] Rajaram & Grundy-Warr, 2007). Scholars are calling for a reorientation of border studies away from the state and in its stead, privilege the perspective and narratives of borders and its inhabitants. This scholarly thrust, however, is nothing new. As early the 1960s noted political geography scholar, Julian Minghi (1963), was already advocating studies on the people inhabiting the border regions as opposed to the boundary itself (Grundy-Warr & Schofield, 2005:653). It was only recently, however, that such thrust has gained ground. The view from the periphery, as the literature suggests, brings into the fore a different account and understanding of the lived and experienced reality at the border.

The everyday politics of life in the border regions entail interactions not only with the state, institutions, and communities within the border but also across it. Depending on the history, socio-cultural linkages, politics, economics, and the porosity of the border regions, communities within the border regions are continually engaged in a variety of negotiations and accommodations as they interact with those across the border. These interactions have significant bearing on the understanding of borders, collectivities, and nation-states. The literature on borders, however, focuses more on "how states deal with their borderlands [and] have paid much less attention to how borderlands have dealt with their states. As a result, "borderlands have been represented as far more passive than is warranted" (Baud & van Schendel, 1997:235). A focus, therefore, on the people and their lives at the peripheries challenges the view that border regions are the sole domain of states. Rather, it is a site of multiple actors and its meanings are not fixed but contested and changing.

This paradigmatic shift in border studies does not only deconstructs the view that borders are "unchanging, unproblematic, and unchallenged"

(Baud and van Schendel, 1997:217) but also questions the mainstream conceptualizations of borders in the social sciences that "are unconsciously bound to a spatial system characterized by more or less exclusive state boundaries" (Horstmann & Wadley, 2006:3). Within this body of knowledge, border interactions are gauged within the languages of law, order, and analytic categories that presuppose social fixity. Population movements, for instance, become aberrations, irregular, or unauthorized rather than socially embedded processes at the edges of states. Moreover, the history of the margins has largely been about the state. It is a history, according to Thongchai, of exclusion, suppression, and silencing of certain parts from becoming part of the national narrative (2003:12). Hence, a more robust conceptualization and understanding of the border can only occur if border research takes into account the narratives of other players in the peripheries other than the state.

This proposition finds great resonance in Southeast Asia, where border regions between states continue to be sites of intense cross-border movements and interactions (Batistella and Asis, 2003; Wong, 2005; Horstmann and Wadley, 2006). These exchanges are best exemplified by the traffic of labor, traders, students, tourists and pilgrims in the peripheries of states, which more often occur irrespective of the bureaucratic or legal implications of crossing the border. The dominance of state discourse in defining these movements and interactions, both in practice and theory, however, has constricted the understanding of the nuances and complexity of border dynamics in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the preponderance of studies centered on the state has "silenced the histories, cultures and a whole myriad of issues that underlie cross-border mobility" (Grundy-Warr, 2004:230). Wong laments that the unquestioning adoption of state agendas on the border by scholars explains much of the conceptual penury in border studies (2005:92).

While arguably there is a body of literature on Southeast Asia that takes into consideration the socio-historical dynamics of border regions, Horstmann and Wadley's review of these studies shows that few have taken the border and its conceptual impact into full account (2006:5). Thongchai's (1994) work on modern Thailand's territoriality and nationhood has been one of the celebrated studies on border and state formation. Yet, few have truly followed his lead and take a critical and detailed attention on the ambiguity and complexity of border regions.

This study draws from these people-centered studies of the border in its attempt to examine the socio-historical dynamics of a border region. Following Baud and van Schendel (1999), the study uses a historically-grounded approach in examining how the colonial and postcolonial projects of state formation affected the dynamics at the peripheries. To address this question, the study begins with an analysis of the pre-colonial organization of political space and this is juxtaposed with the territoriality of the colonial and postcolonial nation-states. This analysis is critical since the persistence of pre-colonial practices in the border region informs, facilitates, and accounts for contemporary cross-border interactions. This is followed by an examination of the how communities at the border dealt with the construction of state borders within their midst. Given the limitations of the study, it will restrict the analysis of the contestation, negotiation, and accommodation of the border to the experiences of a particular group at the border.

The border region between the Philippines and Indonesia, specifically the area between Southeastern Mindanao and Northern Sulawesi, is chosen as case study because of its historical cross-border relations, which continue to present. In part, the study is also prompted by the lack of studies on these areas. Many of the histories of communities in the area have yet to be studied and documented. The life-histories of the Sangir-Talauds, in particular, are fitting for the objectives of this study since their lives

traverse both sides of this border region. Prior to the formation of nation-states, the earliest kingdoms of this community covered the present border region of the Philippines and Indonesia. With colonization, they were pushed out from the Philippines and yet they remain part of the country, albeit occupying a liminal space in the border.

The study seeks to contribute towards a broader understanding of the dynamics of communities within this border region. This understanding is critical as local governments on both sides of the border are at the initial stage of developing state-led cross-border cooperation and an economic growth area. The voices of the border peoples are yet to be part of this agenda. As studies show on existing "economic growth triangles" in Southeast Asia, the creation of borderless economic zones do not necessarily lead to freer mobility of border communities or their inclusion in these new spaces (see for instance, Ford & Lyons, 2006).

Borders and Territorialities

There are a variety of terms that are used to denote the peripheries of nation-states: boundary, border, frontier, and border region. The term boundary, according to Baud and van Schendel (1997:213), refers to the precise legal line dividing state territories but it may also mean in general terms, divisions between societies and cultures. The term frontier, on the other hand, means the zones or regions of separation, contact, and transition between political units (Kristof, 1959:269). Frontier may also mean the "empty spaces" at the edges of states that need to be filled in, such as the case of 19th century American frontiers, (Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999:603) or it could be the areas with least state control prior to the demarcation of fixed territorial boundaries (Grundy-Warr, 1993:45). Anderson and O'Dowd write that a border is somewhere between a boundary and frontier (1999:603). The study follows the definition of Baud and van Schendel (1997:214) of border as political divides or social

constructions as a result of nation-building. This definition is chosen to stress the significance of the border genesis in understanding its dynamics.

The study, however, does not focus on the political questions of boundary demarcation but rather on the impact of this process on communities on border regions on both sides of the line. The term border region refers to areas or zones flanking and straddling international boundaries, including administrative regions abutting a border whose centers are physically and socially distant from that border (Grundy-Warr, 1993:45; Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999:595). It is similar to the terms: borderland, border landscapes, or borderscapes used in the disciplines of history and geography. Because of its proximity to the boundary, it is at the border regions where the negotiations, contestations, and accommodations of territorial pursuits of states take place. It is presumed to encapsulate, according to Donnan and Wilson, "a variety of identities, social networks, and formal and informal, legal and illegal relationships which tie together people in the areas contiguous to the borderline" (1999:50). Depending on history, socio-cultural linkages, economic and political relations of states, a border region may be alienated, coexistent, interdependent, or integrated (Martinez, 1994).

The meaning and functions of borders stem from the significance of territory and territoriality in the organization of modern political space. The territory of the modern nation-state, according to Thongchai, "is not simply [about] a sizeable piece of the earth's surface, but it is a territoriality" (1994:16). Territoriality, according to its foremost theorist, Robert Sack, is "a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control actions and interactions of people, things, and relationships by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a geographic area" (1983:55). Sack outlines three basic facets of territoriality (1983:58-59). First, it uses area to classifies and defines things, thereby simplifying social phenomena or relations according to their location in space and disregarding other forms

of scales. The territory or geographic space becomes the basis of identity or the object to which other attributes are assigned. Second, territoriality also involves a form of communication through only one kind of marker or sign – the boundary. The boundary marks not only the boundedness of the territory but also makes visible territorial possession, exclusion, and inclusion. Third, each instance of territoriality involves an attempt at enforcing control "by proscribing or prescribing specific activities within spatial boundaries" (Vanderegeest & Lee, 1995:388), with corresponding punishment for transgression.

It this type of territoriality that underscores the modern state-system, which is characterized by a division of the world into fixed, exclusive, and bounded territorial spaces. These spaces are neatly defined in maps and treaties. Sovereign control over these territories is vested in the state. The state is the primary actor in this system and thus every aspect of the society is organized based on the state – national economy, national culture, national language, to cite a few. Interactions among states are mainly towards the pursuit of states' individual interests and the security of their territories. As the representative and container of a society, the state is deemed to speak and exists on behalf of the nation. Within the nation-state system, Agnew (1994) points out that political identity becomes defined in exclusively state-territorial terms and this likewise involves "rigid separation between those people within the territorial space pursuing 'universal' values (politics) and those outside practicing different, and inferior values" (63). Hence, the members of a particular state are expected to resemble homogeneity in terms of culture, beliefs, and language.

Territoriality inevitably produces and focuses attention on the border (Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999:598). It is at the border or border regions where territoriality is concretely manifested and expressed. More than demarcation of state territories, borders serves as "disruptive agents of territoriality" (Mishra, 2008:112). It is the point or zone where crossing

territories entails transformation in values and movement into a different social, economic, or political space (Donnan & Wilson, 1999:107). As Mishra notes, borders "attempt to disrupt social (or demographic) continuities and achieve this by separating 'us' from 'them'—arguably the most potent form of the self–other binary and the most effective strategy of exclusion in the modern world" (2008:112-113). Borders, together with the institution of citizenship, designate inclusion and exclusion and define the sociopolitical community both in terms of "who we are" as well as "who we are not" (Christopher, 2005:14).

States, therefore, jealously guard their borders to ensure that whoever passes through conforms to prescribed criteria of entry and membership in the state. An 'infinite administrative classificatory scheme' (Shamir, 2005:209) and a variety of governance technologies are employed to monitor, categorize, and control desirable and undesirable 'aliens' who seeks entry to the state. The visa system, for example, includes a long list of categories according to skills, nationality, education, civil status, and possible contribution to the receiving state.

Furthermore, borders as zones of exclusion not only demarcate belonging and non-belonging in the territory, but likewise, disregard affinities and histories that go beyond the geographic space of the state. This is because, according to Anderson and O'Dowd (1999), territoriality in general oversimplifies and distorts social relations: it assumes a simple and direct equation between the "spatial" and "social" when in fact their interrelationships are complex (598). This assumption of congruence between the conceived space and social dynamics make territoriality inherently conflict-laden and problematic. These conflicts are manifested more often in the border regions as they are the site where contradictory processes and meanings of territoriality and border spaces collide and meet.

While borders are meant to be disruptive agents of social continuities across their space, they are also the site where the notion of bounded collectivities, the nation-state's ideal of homogeneity, and centralized political control are disrupted and contested (Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999:596). The imagined projection of territorial power and organization of states rarely coincides with the lived reality at the border. As Vanderegeest and Lee (1995) describe it, the experienced territory or space at the border is not "abstract and homogeneous, but located, relative, and varied" (389). Borders as defined on maps, policies and state discourse do not necessarily coincide with the behavior, attitudes, and practices on the ground. Nugent and Asiwaju argue that "there is generally a gap...between the intentions of those who police boundaries and popular perceptions and between policy and the flow of everyday life" (1996:1). Thus, while borders are the limits of the imagined "us" and "others," the insiders and outsiders, they are on the other hand, the beginning of both the real and imagined relations of border communities with their affinities and associations across the border. Furthermore, the mundane needs in the border necessitate border people to subvert, flout or ignore the existence of demarcation between them and their neighbors across the national fences. Borders then from the perspective of their inhabitants, as Bustamante describes them, are "broad scenes of intense interactions in which people from both sides work out everyday accommodations based on face-to-face relationships" (as quoted in Baud and van Schendel, 1997:216). Hence, instead of erecting walls and fences, Nugent and Asiwaju point out, "the reality is frequently [border] set ups a zone of interaction rather than representing a genuine partition" (1996:2).

Karin Dean (2007, 2005) frames this gap between intention, perception, and reality through a tricameral view of border spaces. Drawing from the works of Lefebvre and Sojay, Dean distinguishes three interdependent and interacting moments of space – lived, perceived, and conceived. These spaces are described below:

> Conceived space is the imagined representation of space as found in normative forms of spatial knowledge. It is powerful; it dominates and codes that which is perceived, while submerging lived space. Perceived space is the mundane space of everyday life and of its spatial practices easily recognized and discussed. Although *close to* the real space, it is labeled *perceived* to insist that there is no objective reality: that what we consider reality is actually perceived as such. *The* reality is the world as each individual perceives and senses it. Lived space is produced and obscured by conceived space, and it is also different from the culturally normative perceived space. It is re/produced in direct contradistinctions to the homogenizing influences of conceived space, while being the creative source of the latter. Whereas conceived is convergent, lived space is divergent, resistant, and marginal. These three moments of space are interactive and interdependent, and cannot exist independent of one another. (emphasis in original; Dean, 2007:186)

The territoriality of modern nation-states encapsulates the conceived space; the imagined projection and organization of political space. In the border, the most visible is the lived space; the routine religious worship, market day across the border, commuting across the river. The conceived space, while clearly defined in maps and treaties, is particularly not conspicuous, if not invisible at all. At times, signposts, checkpoints, and flags render the conceived *perceptible* (or communicated following Sack's concept of territoriality); otherwise, there is no way to demarcate the ends of states. Hence, daily practices transcend or undermine the border in numerous ways (Dean, 2007:186). In instances where the conceived space become real through state campaigns and military presence, such as in the Thai-Burma border, Deans notes that people are able to quietly and creatively resist and circumvent aspects of this space in their everyday lives. For example, the centuries-old five day market, where a market moves around from village to village cross three state boundaries – Chinese, Shan, and Kachin continues despite the imposition of the international boundary between China and Burma. In this regard, Dean asks whether it is the border challenging and intruding on the everyday lives of people, rather than the other way around (2007:191).

In Southeast Asia, the lived space at the border traces its roots to the pre-colonial political organization of space, which is significantly different from the colonially-enforced territoriality of modern nation-states. It is the persistence of practices associated with this pre-colonial structure that impede the hegemony of conceived and perceived spaces. It is necessary, therefore, to examine pre-colonial dynamics to better understand the contradictions in the modern organization of space.

Political Spaces of the Past

There are a variety of conceptual models, which seek to capture and explain the nature of pre-colonial political space in Southeast Asia, such as Wolter's *mandala* (1982), Tambiah's *galactic polity* (1976), and Anderson's Java's idea of power (1990). The concept of the *segmentary* state has been widely used when referring to maritime states (see for instance Warren (1981) and Junker (2000)). While scholars argue that the early polities in the region were not identical and any attempt at universal categorizations and modeling may lead to misunderstandings, they, nonetheless, agree that these polities manifest similar organizing principles (Baker, 2002: 172).

The pre-colonial polities in Southeast Asia were defined less by geographic sphere of political authority than the interlacing of relations, which transcended polities, ethnicity, and families. As Kathirithamby-Wells sums it up, the "polity was more an area of influence than a unit of territory" (1990:11). The boundary, if ever there was, was highly ambiguous as the decentralized political organization allowed a peripheral space to be a center on its own and sometimes, the nexus of multiple loyalties or a middle zone between competing polities. Within the maritime areas of Southeast Asia, trade was one of the essential elements linking the varied coastal and inland polities. The networks of maritime trade navigated across the Tagalogs, Taosugs, Bruneians, Bajaus, Bugis, Makassarese,

Madurese, Minangkabaus, Malays, and Javanese, as well as, with other aquatic worlds in Asia and beyond (Shaharil, 2001:771).

There are distinct differences of pre-colonial polity with the modern nation-state. First, the polity was defined and organized less on territory but more so by personal relationships between and among polities, between rulers and subjects, and between periphery and the center. This was partly due to the low population densities of polities and partly, on the organization of trade, especially among the maritime states (Hall, 1985:4; Junker, 2000:14). The polities' primary concern therefore is to maintain a sizeable manpower base to fuel the polity's various needs. The mobilization of human resources was achieved through establishment and maintenance of alliances between and among the polities, such as through intermarriages. Slave raiding was also common, as was, the practice of attracting people to the polity through open trading ports and provision of residence (Baker, 2002:173). Hence, it was quite common to find major polities as cosmopolitan centers of varying religion, ethnicity, and interests.

Second, allegiances to the polity or to the alliance were temporary and fluctuating contingent on the ability of ruler or the leading polity to dispense and redistribute resources among allied polities and subjects. Moreover, "subordinate polities were always on the lookout for better alliances, more reliable protectors, and more profitable opportunities" (Amoroso & Abinales, 2005:23). Allegiances were, also, always dispersed across polities, at times fleeting. The loyalty of an individual was to the chief where he resides or where he is in a particular period, such as in the case of itinerant merchants, whose business depends on the acquiescence of the local chief where his ship is currently docked. On the other hand, a polity may be allied with other polities or under the influence of two or powerful polities. Thus, as Taylor notes, "people, groups, entities we might call polities, had multiple relationships with other people and other polities" (2002:6).

Third, the organization of the polity was decentralized as each level of inter-polity alliances were structurally and functionally equivalent at every level (Warren, 1981:xxii). Each polity is able to wield authority over his subjects, and while at the same time may be under the influence of a more powerful polity. The power of the center wanes as it moves towards the far distant allied polities. Yet, because the obligations were mutual and there was space for continual bargaining position in the alliance (Taylor, 2002:6), cohesion is maintained and disintegration is averted.

Fourth, in this highly fluid space, Thongchai argues that borders rarely exist, and if they do, they do not refer to lines separating people and states (1994:75). He noted that in Siam, for example, there were many words that approximate the term "border" but they all tend to signify areas, districts and frontiers at the extremities of kingdoms but not boundary lines (1994:75). This could be largely because of the flexible nature of the traditional Southeast Asian states, which Anderson described as:

> The territorial extension of the state is always in flux; it varies to according to the amount of Power concentrated at the center ....the kingdoms were regarded as not having fixed and charted limits, but rather flexible, fluctuating perimeters. In a real sense, there were no political frontiers at all, the Power of one ruler gradually shifting into the distance and merging imperceptibly with the ascending Power of a neighboring sovereign (as quoted in Carsten, 1998:40).

The political space of pre-colonial Southeast Asia, therefore, was not classified according to geographic space but rather organized around rulers, family linkages. There was no territorial border to speak of primarily because land was not the basis of power and authority. In a sense, this space could be described as a 'space of flows and networks.' It would not be surprising that pre-colonial societies were arguably more mobile than at present (Reid, 1993). This fluid and fractured space, however, would soon be significantly altered by colonialism, but pre-colonial spatial practices would not readily fade away.

Colonial Projects and Redefining Space

The division of Southeast Asia into separate territories beginning in the mid-seventeenth century by the colonial powers and the subsequent formation of nation-states reconfigured the relations between people and space. Perceiving existing polities to lack coherence and organization, the colonizers imposed a new elaborate state system of bureaucratic institutions, defined and exclusive territories marked by boundaries, a market economy, and hegemonic politics (Shamsul, 2003:3). The formation of the border was central to the efforts of the colonizers to establish control over the people in their territories and to force them to produce revenues (Horstmann, 2002:20). Using modern technologies such as maps, census, marriage regulation and naturalization, they defined who belong to their territories and forcibly integrated culturally diverse communities completely ignoring and displacing centuries of unrestricted interactions and communal existence. Through these processes, individual identity was fixed with membership in a particular territory. It did not allow for fluidity or flexibility, as membership in the collective demanded loyalty and allegiance.

The economic relations of communities were also disrupted with the imposition of taxes and quotas and restricted the fluid movement of goods and people. The geographical openness of traditional trade which allowed for a variety of mercantile routes were re-oriented toward the colonial centers such as Rangon, Saigon, Singapore, Batavia, and Manila (Tagliacozzo, 2005b:150) so the colony can control commerce and properly levy taxes. Such a strategy enabled the colony to control and redirect the goods that passed along pre-colonial trade routes.

Map 1. Map of Southeast Asia. It is based on the Southeast Asia map from the CIA World Fact Book 2008 at http://www.cia.gov/.

In enforcing the border, the colonial rulers used the navy, the army, the police and the law (Tagliacozzo, 2005b:150), whose ability to control or oversee the long stretches of border regions were severely challenged by inhabitants on both sides of the line. Tagliacozzo's (2005a) study of the Netherlands East Indies illustrates how the Dutch skillfully used these instruments to harden their borders. The navy ensured that the large archipelago was connected and watched, while the army and later the police made certain that the colonies were taken seriously on the ground (Tagliacozzo, 2005b:167). Using instruments of extradition, treaties, and most importantly, implementing a form of subject-status relationship, whereby local populations were made legally answerable to local state authorities, the Dutch were able to impose the border through legal concreteness as well (Tagliacozzo, 2005b:162).

The seeming pervasiveness of the powers of the colonial state and the boundary enforcement mechanisms fully in place by the start of the twentieth century was not able to put a complete stop and fully control the traditional trade and mobility of people across state borders. Indigenous groups vigorously resisted the colonial policies through evasion and flight, smuggling, piracy, and migration (Wadley and Ishikawa, as quoted in Hortsmann, 2002:20). The border became a convenient escape route to avoid payment of taxes, escape punishment and forced conscription. As borders were miles away from the colonial centers, the practical requirements of daily life and economics necessitated border communities interacting across the border. The Kenyahs in Dutch Borneo, for instance, directed their trading expeditions to bazaars in British Borneo, which could be reached in ten days as compared to two months of travel to reach the nearest trading centers of the Dutch in Borneo (Lumenta, 2005:7). Others simply did not mind the imaginary lines drawn on the ground and went on with their lives.

The extent of mobility during the colonial period can be gleaned from Carsten's (1995) documentation of migration histories of residents in a village on the island of Langkawi, which lies off the coast of the Malay Peninsula, just south of the border between Malaysia and Thailand. Langkawi in earlier periods was part of the trading center in mainland Kedah. Residents trace their origins to Penang, Perlis, Perak, Johor, Terengganu, Negeri Sembilan, Aceh, Minangkabau, Java, India, and Hong Kong. Many came in the mid-19th century to find a living. Carsten, however, notes that given the residents limited knowledge of earlier history of their ancestors, many may have come in earlier times since the island was part of the booming regional economy and trade in this part of pre-colonial Southeast Asia (1995:321).

Mobility would be further prompted by the severe lack of required labor to fuel the colony's expansion and development. This was despite earlier importation of workers from China and India, for example, in the case of the British colonies. The colonial governments designed an organized system of recruitment of labor from across the border but it was not able to deter the concomitant spontaneous flow of workers. In the late 19th century, when the British contracted collie migrants from Indonesia (mostly from Java) to work in road projects and plantations in then colonial Malaya, it was simultaneously accompanied by a largely spontaneous labor movement of Minangkabau, Batak, Bugis, Banjarese, from other islands of the Netherlands East Indies (Hugo, 1993:37; see also Kaur, 2005). Some of these contract coolie workers would eventually settle in Malaya. Hugo (1993) notes that in 1930 there were 89,735 Java-born persons living in Malaya and this would increase to 189,450, around by 111 percent by 1947. The pathways these workers trod were the same routes of future labor flows long after the colonizers left and continue to be up to the present (Hugo, 1993:38). The early settlers would be significant links to later migrants.

Postcolonial Space: Ambivalent State, Resolute Border Region

The successor postcolonial states would inherit the colonially-designed territories, along with a continuing flow across of people, goods, and ideas at the border (Tagliacozzo, 2005b:168). While the ensuing postcolonial nation building projects were underscored by rhetoric of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the border regions hardly mattered in the priorities of the state. Wong describes the attitude of postcolonial states as "generally been agnostic with respect to the border and negligent with practices of border control" (2005:72). Amidst the ensuing nationalization of almost every aspect of the postcolonial states from economics, culture, education, and even religion (in some states), paradoxically, the border regions were "ignored, taken-for-granted and seen as peripheral, not just in the literal geographic sense but in political and social terms" (Anderson, O'Dowd, & Wilson, 2002:3). The economic development and modernization programs that states would undertake would be largely concentrated in their economic and political centers. This would lead to uneven levels of development, particularly between the central and peripheral areas. The border areas stagnated and in most instances, became impoverished.

The territoriality of postcolonial states which rests, in part, on enforcement and control at the borders was weakened by its unreliable, in some cases, non-existent police power at the border. Border posts were and remain poorly manned and equipped. Graft and corruption are fairly common in border areas. As national resources are limited and the state has other immediate concerns, the borders and its management have been one of the least important priorities of states.

Yet, despite its indifference to the border, the postcolonial state was not willing to let go of its spaces in the margins. The state violently responded to separatist movements, some of which were rooted in pre-colonial geography and association and rekindled partly by marginalization

in the postcolonial state. These movements were represented in the national discourse as threats to the unity and peace of the nation-state. This explains why in contrast to the western notion of state security, in Southeast Asia, threats were represented more as coming from within the state, rather than externally. The progress of the state hinged on the unity of the nation.

The poverty, lawlessness, porosity, underdevelopment and separatism became the primary vignettes of borders in the minds of those in the centers of the state. The border was pictured as a place of purveyors of violence, disorder, and disunity. This was played up not only by the national media and governmental discourse but even in the academe. The border was deemed a high security risk for research. It was isolated and unknown. In some states, it was quite difficult to get government permits to conduct fieldwork or even gain access to public information on the border (Wadley, 2002:3). As a result, the periphery became also marginal in the production of knowledge.

The marginalization of border was carried over in the history writing of the postcolonial state. The colonial projects of integration, assimilation and belongingness in the imagined space of the nation was reproduced in the postcolonial era under the rubric of nationalism and promoted common identity, unwavering loyalty, and strong civic consciousness. The national history was rewritten to represent the purported 'real' narrative of the people as opposed to the colonially imposed version. Ironically, the supposed people's history, writes Baker, "took the national territory as its space and narrated the rise and fall of the state inside that container," (2002:170) oblivious to the fact that the territory is a recent creation and whose formation suppressed other histories, particularly those at the margins of the states. Thongchai was trenchant in describing this process of history writing:

> The grid of the modern mind renders the unfamiliarity of the indigenous polity and geography more familiar to us by translating them into modern discourse. ... Consequently, these studies mislead us into considering only the point of view of those states which became modern nations. Whenever the issue is raised, we hear only the claims of the major nations. The fate of the tiny tributaries under dispute remains virtually unknown. Their voices have not been heard. It is as if they occupied a dead space with no life, no view, no voice, and thus no history of their own (1994:96).

Moreover, nationalism raised national alarm against the not-so unfamiliar 'intruders' at entry points of and within the state, who once again become aliens and strangers. But then again, threats to nationalism were seen to emanate less from those crossing the border into the states than within divisions among ethnic groups, as well as from not-so unfamiliar 'foreigners' inside the state, such as the Indians and Chinese (Mak, 2006; Hau, 2000). It was not until the end of the 1960s when Communism became a threat to the security of democratic states that border crossings were seriously looked upon. After the threat died down, however, the states returned to their centers and once more left the borders on their own. In the case of Malaysia, the flow of Indonesians beginning in the 1960s was not classified as a threat until the early 1980s, when prompted by the influx of refugees from Vietnam, the state started to develop foreign labor policies.

The indifference of states towards their borders and precarious hold on them, not to mention their lack of the capacity to provide the infrastructure to guard their highly permeable terrestrial and maritime boundaries account for the continuation of pre-colonial ties and network and the unabated flow of border crossings. Border communities looked towards the centers of states nearest to their areas for livelihood and better opportunities. In the case of the people of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, it was Sabah, one of the centers of development of the federated Malaysia. Sabah would also be the destination of many Indonesians from Sulawesi and

Kalimantan. The border highlighted, in a sense, not only the political boundaries but also the differences in levels of development and access to opportunity.

Massive cross-border labor flows would be triggered by the late 1960s and early 1970s by the need for cheap workers as states like Malaysia and Thailand embarked on an aggressive industrialization programs. As part of its New Economic Policy (NEP), Malaysia required much manpower to carry out its ambitious infrastructure projects and land development schemes (Nayagam, 1992:483; Narayanan and Lai, 2005:33). Like its British predecessors, the Malaysian state sourced its much need labor from the neighboring states of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Labor flows would be further induced as Indonesia and the Philippines lagged behind the economic progress achieved by Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. All the while, labor recruitment occurred without proper documentation and tacit immigration policies. The practice of hiring 'illegal' workers without government restraint was to persist until the early 1980s when Malaysia began implementing foreign labour laws (Wong & Anwar, 2003).

Labor flows would be accompanied by movements of goods across the border, partly because the border economy is loosely integrated with the center and partly due to geographical reasons. It is often cheaper to source goods from across the border than from the distant regional or state centers. In Tawi-Tawi, for instance, it is quite ordinary to find goods produced in Malaysia than from the Philippines as travel to islands north of Sabah would only take a few hours. The border also provides a market opportunity for locally banned goods readily available on the other side, such as guns and narcotics. All of which would take place without regard for the presence of the boundary and the accompanying legal implications (Scalabrini Migration Center, 2000).

In these instances of border crossings, the social networks that long existed would be revitalized, reinforced, and reshaped according to the needs of the time. Colonial projects failed to cut these linkages; they merely became "transboundary." In the postcolonial period, networks were reorganized to conform to new realities within the state boundaries. For example, the traditional market in borders of Kachin, China, and Burma mentioned earlier was sustained among others, by long-held practice of intermarriages within this area. According to Dean, with the economic development in Chinese area of the border beginning in the mid-1980s, more Kachin women from Burma are marrying Kachin men in China, which was the reverse prior to the 1980s with more Kachin girls from China getting hooked with Kachin men in Burma (2005:817). Nonetheless, intermarriage continues to serve as highly meaningful integrative element among the territorially divided communities of Kachins.

On the other hand, Walker's (1999) study on the long distance traders in the borderlands of Laos, Thailand, China and Burma shows that the border communities were not only active in creating and maintain transborder transactions, but also in reworking state regulatory practices at the border. He argues that contrary to notions of powerless peripheries, the border communities were in fact, critical actors in defining the regulation and organization of trade within these areas. The communities were interacting both with the market and state.

Social networks would also be a significant factor in linking, facilitating, and sustaining population flows. Studies on cross-border mobility in Southeast Asia show that family networks are essential in linking prospective destinations and providing the much needed resource in settlement and integration across the border (Hugo, 1997; Batistella & Asis, 2003). The availability of these resources over time has shaped strategies of migrants in overcoming stringent immigration policies, particularly for illegal migrants. Kasim's studies show that most Indonesians would depend

on relatives, friends or ethnic groups, as well as on taikongs (recruiters/brokers) for temporary accommodation, job information, trading licenses and protection from Malaysian authorities (2000:112).

The response of nation-states in Southeast Asia since 1980 to cross-border flows is reminiscent of colonial governments' policies. Both are premised on the controllability of borders. Castles notes that Asian leaders are hesitant in recognizing the realities of porous boundaries (1998:13); instead, immigration policies are aimed at hardening borders. The limitations and effectiveness of these immigration policies are best represented by the failed efforts of Thailand and Malaysia to control cross-border flows by erecting walls in their adjoining border regions beginning in the 1970s (Castles, 1998:12). The walls were a mix of concrete, barbed wire, steel and iron fencing. They were not able to deter, however, cross-border flows of goods and people. Communities on both sides of the border found ways to overcome the walls and immigration policies such as the use of multiple citizenships, fake identity cards, and cross-border marriages (Horstmann, 2002:21; Scalabrini Migration Center, 2000:15). By 1990s, when Malaysia and Thailand began to tighten their immigration policies, Horstmann noted that "Muslim people in Southern Thailand [made] use of kinship relations and religious networks to get citizenship rights in Malaysia (2002:21). The plan to build a more solid 2.5-meter- high-concrete wall was eventually scrapped in 2001.

Immigration policies also founder on the continuing demand by local economies for cheap labour that flows across borders. In the Malaysian case, for example, labor shortages have persisted despite the presence of foreign labor even during economic crises. From 1980 to 1988, for instance, surveys from the Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia and the United Planters Association of Malaysia reveal a shortage of four to six percent (Nayagam, 1992:482; Pillai, 1992:42). At the height of 1997 crisis, the agriculture and manufacturing sectors reported 60,000 to 70,000 vacancies

(Kassim, 1999:174). The labor shortages are in part caused by refusal of Malaysians to take up jobs in the construction, manufacturing, and plantations because of lack of job security, low wages, and the manual work involved (Nayagam, 1992:483; Pillai, 1992:24-26).[2] In such instances, the Malaysian state has always been a reluctant actor. The country's policies on labor flow, including illegal flows, have been described as ad-hoc, stop-go, inconsistent, and reactive (Kanapathy, 2001:430; Narayanan & Lai, 2005:34; Piper, 2006:361). In 2002, for instance, the Malaysian government deported around 400,000 illegal workers as part of a nationwide campaign to curb illegal migration. The impact on the construction industry (and to some extent, in plantation areas) was immediately felt, with a daily loss of RM5 million because of labour shortages (Batistella and Asis, 2003:19). The government eventually relented to the demands of the industry and allowed the re-entry of Indonesian workers (Batistella and Asis, 2003:19).

Another significant part of government efforts to curb illegal flow across the border is to frame such movements within the discourse of security and threats. As transgressors of the border and violators of migration regimes, border crossers are categorized under non-traditional security concerns as against, for example, the traditional military threats posed by neighboring states (Dupont, 2002:9; Tigno, 2004:158; Mak, 2006). In the post 9-11 global war on terrorism, flows at the border have been further subjected to suspicion as mobility has been conflated with extremist movements at the borders. The paradigm extends to public representation of migrants as harbingers of social instability, criminality and disease. This is evident in Grundy-Warr's (2004) observation on the Thai-Myanmar border:

> ...the border region, particulary the Burmese side, is viewed by many ordinary Thai people as *andharai* (dangerous) and in popular imagination it is the home of unruly drug barons, warlords, ethnic rebels...[and] by extension, refugees and undocumented migrants may be viewed as transmitters of

> anarchy, chaos, crime and disorder into the domain of Thailand (251-252).

Shimizu (2001:4) had a similar observation on the association of Filipinos in Sabah with crimes as reflected in newspaper headlines during his short visit to the area in 1999:

> In the three months between March and May, 1999, the Daily Express, for example, [carried] headlines more than 20 times of arrested Filipinos, such as "High quality IC: Filipino jailed (3/18)," "Bringing in Syabu: Filipino duo jailed (3/24)," "Theft, shoplifting: Filipino, local jailed (4/13)," "Filipino jailed for stealing (4/15)," "Shabu and ganja: Filipino jailed (5/2)" "Fishbomb murder: Filipino charged (5/25)."

This observation is confirmed by a more expanded analysis of news coverage on migrants in English-language Malaysian newspapers, including the government-sanctioned New Strait Times, which shows continuing association of migrants with social problems, including drugs, murder, rape, disease and prostitution (Ford, 2006:235). Crimes committed by migrants in Malaysia, however, remain limited. Based on police statistics provided by Malaysia's Police Inspector-General, Musa Hassan, to a non-government organization, only two percent of the crimes committed in the country are by foreign workers (SUARAM, 2007:16-17). This is also the case in earlier periods.[3]

The paradigm of suspicion has been a powerful metaphor in the construction of the supposed siege and uncontrollability of border flows. This has enabled states to play up the security risks posed by migrants to further justify the need "to reinforce the sanctity of national sovereignty and territorial integrity... protect national space and [its] citizens as the constitutive element in the territory" (Grundy-Warr, 2004:252). The border regions remain, however, stubborn to any form of control by the state. Mobility continues to flourish and flow.

Conclusion

Borders and their study cannot be reduced to the conceived notions of the modern nation-state – closed, controlled, and stable. Beneath the neat cartographies of boundaries between states are histories, experiences, and geographies that continue to resist and reclaim their place in these spaces. In Southeast Asia, these histories trace the roots of current trans-border flows to the pre-colonial relations between communities and polities. Mobility was an essential aspect of these relations. The colonial projects may have carved out Southeast Asia into distinct territories and redefined the repertoire of communal relations but they failed nonetheless, to break up the links and mobile practices between communities. The indifference of postcolonial states to their peripheries and feeble attempts to control flows did little to stem the persistence of flows.

This will be the context from which this study will look at the case of the Sangir-Talauds as they navigate through the history of the border between the Philippines and Indonesia. The second chapter examines the pre-colonial political, economic and cultural spaces of this border region by framing it within the maritime world of the Sulu-Sulawesi region. It also explores the early history of Sangir-Talauds in the area. The chapter ends with the intrusion of the Spanish into Mindanao and the political reconfiguration of the area. The third chapter begins with the colonization of Mindanao by the Americans and brief discussion on their associated settlement programs there. This era also witnessed the Sangir-Talauds 20th century movement into Mindanao. The chapter examines the factors behind their mobility, their life histories and issues faced as they settled in Mindanao. The fourth chapter briefly examines how the Sangir-Talauds' migration in the area were perceived by the Philippine state and local host communities. It also takes a short foray into the policies implemented by the state. The fifth chapter summarizes the findings of the study and presents the conclusion.

Chapter II
From Zone of Contact to Zone of Division: The Maritime World of Sulu-Sulawesi Sea

This chapter examines the contexts, patterns, and dynamics of relations in the border regions of the Philippines and Indonesia in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. Fundamental to understanding this border region is to interpret its dynamics from the broader political, economic and socio-cultural processes within the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, particularly during the pre-colonial period. The maritime polities within this area were largely linked by trade and familial relations and their political organization was characteristic of other maritime polities in Southeast Asia. The subject border region of this study was a communal space not only for polities within the area but also for travelers and merchants coming from other parts of the Asian region and beyond. To use the metaphor of the sea, the interactions and exchanges were boundless. The notion of the sea as a natural boundary was alien to the settlers of the various islands in this area. The Sangir-Talauds were one of the many groups who tamed and traversed this vast body of water. The first section covers this period of borderless political space, as well as, the history of the Sangir-Talauds. The second section the transformation of the area into a border region and its subsequent administrative reorganization to conform to the exigencies of modern state governance. From a center of contacts and exchange, the sea became a divide and frontier. Trade and the loyalties of peoples were directed towards the centers of the colonies away from their kin and economic partners across the sea. Yet, as people's lives and cultures follow the rhythm of the sea, the ancient maritime highways became routes of "subterfuge" and "evasion" as people defied the invisible lines of demarcation for trade and other purposes.

Geographical Background

The Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, in geological and oceanographical terms, covers approximately 900,000 km^2 and includes the two largest seas in the area, Sulu and Sulawesi, and several other smaller seas – the Sibuyan, Visayan and Camotes Seas in the northeast and the Bohol Sea further south (DeVantier, Alcala, & Wilkinson, 2004). It is bounded on the southwestern section by the northeastern portion of Borneo (comprised of Indonesian East Kalimantan and Malaysian Sabah), while the Palawan and Visayas islands define its border in the north. The peninsula of North Sulawesi, including the Sangir-Talaud archipelago, forms the south and southeastern borders and northern and eastern Mindanao define the eastern section. The Sulu-Sulawesi Sea is divided among three states: Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.[4]

The focus of this study is on the southeastern side of the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, in particular, Southeastern Mindanao and North Sulawesi, the modern maritime border regions of Indonesia and the Philippines. The Balut and Sarangani islands[5] are the southernmost islands of Mindanao on the Philippine side of the border. Across the border is the Sangir-Talaud[6] group of islands, composed of 112 islands, 30 of which are inhabited, and referred to in Indonesia as *Nusa Utara* or northern archipelago and officially part of North Sulawesi, Indonesia. Balut Island is about 35 nautical miles from Marore, one of the northernmost islands in the Sangir-Talaud archipelago. Travel time by motorized boat between the two islands takes about two to four hours depending on sea conditions. From Manado, the political and economic capital of North Sulawesi, Marore is around 280 miles and sea travel takes about ten to twelve hours.

Although, the study refers to the Sulu and Ternate Sultanates, it principally discusses pre-colonial Magindanao Sultanate whose history is intricately linked with the histories of the communities and islands in

Southeastern Mindanao and the Sangir-Talaud Islands. The area where the Sultanate of Magindanao was located in pre-colonial Sulu-Sulawesi world is now part of Cotabato City. It should be not be confused with the Magindanao ethnic group and the present Province of Magindanao.

Limitations of Sources

Despite the richness of history of the focus area of this study, the literature remains sparse. There has been no archaeological work conducted, for instance, on Magindanao (Junker, 2000:102). The VOC records on this area have not been fully exhausted, such that it was one of the priority research areas identified by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research under the TANAP program.[7] This is contrast to the southwestern section covering the Sulu and Sabah islands where extensive studies have been done. In the case of the Sangir-Talaud archipelago, it remains an unexplored "frontier" for historical research (Lapian, 2003:6). Kaunang (2001) points out that even the official *Sejarah Nasional* (National History) of Indonesia only has two references on the archipelago. The first one refers to the islands as being home to some of the finest sea navigators in the area and second, as a dependency of the Ternate Sultanate. Ricklef's (2001) well-known work, *A History of Indonesia*, also does not have references concerning the archipelago.

On the Philippine side, there have been studies done on the Magindanao Sultanates but not much on other histories of smaller kingdoms during the pre-colonial period, particularly on the southeastern section of Mindanao. Laarhoven's (1989) detailed examination of Dutch sources is an excellent material since it provides a different picture of Magindanao in 17th century. Her work balances the mainly Spanish materials used in the classic works of Ileto (1971), Majul (1973), and Saleeby (1976). Much less have been done on the flow of goods and people in

the area. The study mines these available sources to establish the historical context and patterns of mobility in the area.

Given the limited documentary sources, the study turns to histories from the ground by examining the oral literature and family histories or *tarsila / silsila*[8] of communities in the research area. More than family trees, these narratives provide significant insights into the extent of networks and alliances of the early polities. Elsewhere, noted historians such as Barbaya Andaya (1993), Tony Day (1996), and Heather Sutherland (1973) have extensively used family histories to examine early polities in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. These narratives, however, are not without limitations.

First, Majul (1973:1-6) points out that tarsilas/silsilas were primarily written as genealogical accounts, either lineal or multilineal. Thus, they do not carry specific details on the particulars of the time they were written. There is also problem with chronology as dates are not commonly included in the genealogies. Second, some of these narratives are imbued with mythical tales incorporating real or imagined elements. Third, the transfer of the story from one generation to the next until the time it was put into writing also contributed to confusions in names, places, and relations.

Despite its limitations, however, the value of these genealogies needs to be appreciated on the role of family linkages in the politics and economics of the time. Intermarriages were an essential part of creating and maintaining alliances among the polities. It was imperative, therefore, that ruling elites know the extent of their familial linkages. The family prestige is also partly hinged on the power and influence of their ancestors or familial relations. Moreover, the legitimacy to rule is also gained by tracing lineage to key political or religious figures, such as Prophet Mohamad, or great kingdoms in neighboring areas (Majul, 1973:6). By tracing lineage to a common heroic or mythical individual, it was also possible for peoples of these communities to "perceive far-flung and unfamiliar places as linked to

their own societies through enduring familial ties" (Andaya B., 1993:39) and thus, further strengthening intergroup relations. Local Mindanao historian, Macario Tiu, points out that notwithstanding the legendarization process, scholars should "listen closely and search for the kernels of historian truths and other clues in these so-called naïve stories" (2005:xiv).

There are two sets of genealogies related to Magindanao and Southeastern Mindanao. The first one is composed of royal genealogies of Magindanao collected by Saleeby (1976), which have been the subject of scholarly study in the past decades. Saleeby got hold of these genealogies while working with Muslim *datu*s, sultans and the learned men (ulama) in the 1900s. The second set is a recent collection of genealogies from various communities from Sangir-Talaud Islands, Sarangani Bay and Davao Gulf region by three scholars from Mindanao, North Sulawesi, and Japan (Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999).[9] Compared to Saleeby's collections which were originally written in Arabic, Malay, and local languages, the second set were mainly written in Bahasa Indonesia, Sangil and other local Mindanao languages, and some were based on oral recollections. Unfortunately, however, Hayase and his group did not provide sufficient information on the persons who provided the tarsila, particularly on the collections from Sangir-Talaud Islands. There was also no mention if and how the tarsilas' authenticity was verified. This collection, however, is highly significant since it covers the kingdoms or chiefdoms on the peripheries of the powerful Magindanao, Sulu, and Ternate sultanates and which other historical sources are lacking in detail. It also provides information where family members moved using present-day names of these areas, unlike the Sulu and Magindanao genealogies where such information is quite limited. Moreover, the tarsilas in the second collection contain references to the current generation. The problems raised by Majul (1973) in the Magindanao genealogy are also true in the second set of genealogies. There is a serious problem with chronology and dates; confusion with names, relatives, and places; and the fusion of two or more

different events. Ulaen notes that even the materials collected from the local government of Sangir-Talaud are riddled with problems of chronology (2003:59-61). As the second set apparently has been updated, some modern names of places do not correspond to specific historical context.[10]

The Political Space of the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea

Like other maritime regions in pre-colonial Southeast Asia, the political milieu of the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea was characterized by fluid, segmented, decentralized, and yet, interconnected kingdoms of varying sizes and complexity. The kingdoms were not defined according to geographic space but rather through personal relations between rulers and subjects. Political power was dispersed and decentralized and inter-kingdom relations were determined through alliances and reciprocity. Overlapping allegiances were quite common as kingdoms and rulers looked for the best opportunities for their subjects. Intermarriages were also familiar occurrences as polities sought to establish and strengthen their alliances, making it occasionally difficult to trace kinship because of interlacing filial relations. Trade has always been pinpointed as the main factor in hastening interconnectedness, as well as fostering a political structure with fluid boundaries and membership (Junker, 2000; Kathirithamby-Wells, 1990; Hall, 1985). Cultural and personal linkages, however, are as significant as these trade imperatives in nurturing the intricate networks between kingdoms, peoples, and rulers in the area. In understanding a particular polity or kingdom in this political space, therefore, it is essential to examine it from its relations and dynamics with others rather in isolation or within its particular territorial space.

The Sangir-Talaud kingdoms were one of the many kingdoms in this maritime region. Based on early Dutch sources, "there were originally two kingdoms in the Sangir-Talaud archipelago but by seventeenth century, they split into nine separate units, together with kingdoms of Siau and

Ta(g)hulandang to the south, made up a total of eleven kinglets...in the nineteenth century, there were still six kingdoms in the area – Tabukan, Manganitu, Kandahar, Tahuna, Tahulandang and Siau – all belonging to the same ethnic group" (Lapian, 2003:6). The kingdoms were politically fragmented (Lapian, 2003:6; Henley, 1993), brought about in part by the sparsity of population, topography of the archipelago and competition. They were extensively linked through intermarriages but never developed into a single polity (Henley, 1993). The people of these kingdoms were known for their advanced maritime culture as demonstrated, for example, in their excellent seafaring and boatbuilding skills and well-developed maritime vocabulary (Henley, 2005:90, Lapian, 2003:6; Lapian, 2008).[11] Dutch accounts show that the Sangirs traveled in groups of up to one thousand, spending months at a time away from home on expeditions to as far away as Manila. This led to settlements in Southern Mindanao, Northern Sulawesi, and North Maluku (Lapian, 2003:6; Henley, 2005:80-81). It is not known, however, when the kingdoms of Tahuna and Kandahar established settlements in Sarangani Island and areas in the Davao Gulf. What is widely recorded is their involvement in the long distance trade that flourished in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea at the beginning of the eleventh century.

Trade and Political Space

Inter-island contact and trade in the Sulu-Sulawesi have been posited to have been frequent as early as the first millennium C.E., predating the entry of Indian, Chinese, and Islamic peoples (Bellwood, 1999:129-136). This indicates that even before the beginning of written histories, people have been on the move and been in contact with other groups. The traditional trading system was characterized by a reciprocal system of exchange of goods between coastal and upland settlements, with the former bringing in salt and other marine produce to barter with rice and forest products not readily available in the lowland. The development

of a more elaborate form of trade, however, started at the beginning of eleventh century when the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea became a major route of traders, particularly the Chinese, seeking the products of the Spice Islands in the Moluccas and who along the way traded with settlements dotting the coasts (Hall, 1985:24).

With the entry of the Chinese, luxury goods (such as porcelain, silk, beads) were introduced as a medium of exchange for mainly interior forest produce such as resins, honey, wax, spices and hardwood (Junker, 2000:22). The sources of these goods in demand were upland and interior settlements and generally were not under the control of coastal kingdoms. The use of force and coercion was not an option for eliciting cooperation because of the rugged topography and fierce resistance from upland settlers (Junker, 2000:22). Coastal states, therefore, promoted alliances, ritual exchange of prestige goods, and intermarriages to integrate the economies of the upper and lower settlements. Katirithamby-Wells (1990) points out that "the acquisition by local chiefs of prestige and luxury goods from trade and redistribution of some of these amongst [allied chiefs] provided the basis for the exercise of economic influence and political authority in [maritime] Southeast Asia" (2).

In the case of the Sangir-Talaud Islands, a similar system of relations which Henley (2005) refers to as "privileged exchange," wherein people within the kingdom were only allowed to trade with the *datu,* who in turn was only one who had the privilege of dealing with foreign traders. The Sangir *datus,* for instance, had vassals in Talaud which were prohibited from sailing to any destination other than Sangir and enforced apparently "on pain of death" (Henley, 2005:76). Imported goods primarily served as a medium exchange between Sangir and its vassals in the archipelago. However, as Henley pointed out, the Talauds were known to have direct contact with Mindanao (2005:76). Beyond local politics, the kingdoms are all tributaries to the more powerful sultanate of Ternate. The kingdoms

known trade goods were coconut oil, brass wire, iron weapons and maritime produce.

As trade and commerce prospered, some coastal states transformed from exchange points to redistribution centers and later on, as port-polities of long-distance or regional trade. By the beginning of 14th century, Sulu and Magindanao were already known in Chinese accounts as having well-developed internal networks for collecting large quantities of exportable forest and maritime products (Junker, 2000:191). Throughout the fifteenth century, the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea would be witness to the traffic of vessels "sometimes manned with several dozen fighting men, traders and slaves, sailing from the Sulu Islands and the Mindanao coast to the Sangihe Islands and then to the Moluccas and back" (Ptak, 1992:38). By this time, a number of islands would be known not only for their seafaring skills but also in boat making, such Sulu and the Sangir-Talaud group (Ptak, 1992:38). Ternate would emerge as the most powerful clove-exporting port at the end of this Chinese trade route. Its influence covered the kingdoms and settlements throughout eastern Indonesia, including North Sulawesi and the Sangir-Talaud Islands. At the time the Iberian colonizers came in 16th century, there was already a steady stream of trade and traders in connecting the various islands from Sulu to the Moluccas. It is thus, not surprising to find local seafarers, with their wide knowledge of the area, in Iberian ships acting as guides in the early explorations of people, like Pigafetta, of the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea (Lapian, 2008:6-8).

Of the three major trading centers to emerge in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, Magindanao's history was intricately linked with the histories of the communities and islands in Southeastern Mindanao and Sangir-Talaud Islands.[12] The Magindanao Sultanate early in its history was divided between two major kingdoms, which were connected by the Pulangi River or Rio Grande. The upper reaches of the river is where the agriculturally-rich Buayan kingdom was located, while the coastal state of Magindanao

was located along the lower end of the river. The Buayan has other exits to the sea but the Pulangi River was the most accessible. Magindanao's frequent contacts with foreign traders, particularly the Chinese, perhaps explain why in most studies the two kingdoms are singly referred to as Magindanao and in earlier maps, Mindanao is used to refer to Magindanao. Ileto (1971) argues that is erroneous since Buayan was as powerful as its coastal rival. The relation between the two kingdoms was beset with intermittent conflicts but marked, as well, with intermarriages in almost every generation. Under the reign of Sultan Qudarat the two rival kingdoms would be finally unified under the Sultanate of Magindanao.

The rise of Magindanao as a major international trading port in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea began after Ternate was put under Dutch protection in 1607 which disrupted the traditional system of trade and agricultural production in the Moluccas (Ileto, 1971:4; Laarhoven, 1990:166). Through selective production of exportable goods and monopoly over production and distribution of more valuable goods such as cloves and nutmegs, the Dutch effectively monopolized trade (Ileto, 1971:4). Local and foreign traders, such as the Chinese, Arabs, and Malays, sought alternative ports and Magindanao presented itself as a free port, which made it the most attractive option. Qudarat's skillful manipulation of its relations with the Spanish, Dutch and even the English allowed the Sultanate maintain its neutrality and independence and proved highly beneficial as it attracted more trade and traders. The Sultanate became home to a variety of traders and slaves, such as the Chinese, Malays, Burmese, Makassarese, Bugis, Ternatans, Amboinese, and even those from the Indian coasts (Laarhoven, 1986:37-14). The Spanish retreat in 1663[13] and absence from Mindanao for almost 50 years allowed Magindanao to freely expand its trade to as far as Batavia, Malacca, Siam, Ternate, Amboina, Madras, and Manila with goods ranging from wax to rice, tobacco, and cinnamon (Abinales, 2000a:47; Ileto, 1971:6, Laarhoven, 1989:213-221).

Magindanao's primary trading and alliance partner was the Sultanate of Ternate even prior to the entry of European colonizers. The relation was not limited to trade but also encompassed political and religious interests. Ternate joined Magindanao as well in resisting Spanish control in the 16th century. In one instance, Ternate sent "a fleet of many caracoas or rowing-barges and other vessels commanded by cachils with selected soldiers numbering over one thousand warriors and a number of light artillery to compel the Spaniards to break their camp [near the mouth of the Pulangi] and go away" (Morga, as quoted in Ileto, 1971:3). Ternate, Magindanao and Buayan also conducted joint raids in Christian settlements in the Visayas and Southern Luzon (Majul, 1973:117). Laarhoven notes that the alliance with Ternate "enabled the Magindanaos to stay around and reside in Ternate, to visit relatives, to renew old acquaintances, and even to fight in ambushes" (1989:40). More than strengthening political relations, the alliance also reinforced the Islamic ties of Magindanao and Ternate. At the end of the 16th century, Ternate is said to have sent Islamic teachers to Magindanao to establish Islamic schools and teach children to write and read the Koran (1989:38). The intensity of this relation, according to Majul, created an erroneous impression among early 17th century Dutch writers who assumed that Magindanao was under Ternate's political control (1973:115).

The kingdoms in the Sarangani-Balut Islands and Sangir-Talaud archipelago were at the crossroads of the trade routes from China to Moluccas and from Magindanao to Ternate and vice-versa. Though no major sultanate or trading port would emerge in the area, the islands were frequently visited by seafarers, including European voyagers. Sangir Island, for instance, was known as a resting and transit point to and from Moluccas, with a good stock of food supply for seafarers. It is also because of this geographical position that these kingdoms found themselves at the crossroads of the influence and control of the powerful Sultanates of Magindanao and Ternate, as well as, the competing European powers. The

ensuing relations between the kingdoms of Sangir-Talaud Islands and the Sultanates were characterized by fluidity and overlapping allegiances.



Map 2. The Sangir-Talaud archipelago, circa 1890s. Source: Hickson, John (1899). *A naturalist in north Celebes: a narrative of travels in Minahassa, the Sangir and Talaut Islands, with notices of the fauna, flora and ethnology of the districts visited.* London.

The kingdoms in the Sangir-Talaud archipelago were primarily tributaries of the Sultanate of Ternate. In 1575, Kandahar and Ternate, for instance, signed a pact to strengthen political and economic alliances (Laarhoven, 1989:16). From the beginning, however, the relations of the Sangir-Talaud kingdoms with Ternate have been precarious and their strategic position between centers of power made them even less dependent on Ternate (Andaya L., 1993:84-85). It was also a relation beset with violence and coercion as Ternate used force to impose its influence and control over the archipelago (Henley, 1993). It is partly because of this that the Sangir-Talauds were thus known to switch allegiance to escape the control of Ternate. When the Spaniards came to the area, a number of local chiefs in Sangir placed themselves under the vassalage of Spain (Henley, 1993:39-41). After Spain withdrew from the Moluccas, many took the Dutch as their patron. Moreover, the strategic location of archipelago in the trade routes from China to Moluccas made local chiefs less dependent on Ternate for imported goods that were needed to acquire local products. As a result, "Ternaten dominance [in the archipelago] had never been more than patchy and intermittent" (Henley, 1993:39-40). By 17th century, while the kingdoms in the archipelago signed treaties with the Dutch as their new patron, they were also quite active in maintaining trade relations with Magindanao.

The history of relations with Magindanao follows footsteps to a very distant past. The kingdoms in the Sangir-Talaud archipelago trace their beginnings to a prince who hails from Magindanao. His story of moving to Sangir and returning to Mindanao before his death will be replicated in the patterns of chiefs in Sangir being born in Mindanao, ruling in Sangir, and retiring in Mindanao. This should not a come as a surprise since from the perspective of this period, southeastern Mindanao was also home to the Sangir-Talauds and it was part of their kingdoms. As reflected in the genealogies, they had a number of settlements in the areas surrounding Davao Gulf areas and Sarangani Bay. It is because of their presence in

Sarangani Bay that they would have close family and political contacts with the Buayan kingdom in the upper valley of Magindanao.

Familial and Mythological Affinities

The origin myth of Sangir kingdoms recounts that Gumansalangi, son of a Cotabato[14] sultan named Laesangalung, founded the kingdom of Tampung-Lawo or Sangihe Geguwa between 1300 and 1400 A.D. (Juda, 1995:105-110; Hayase, Non & Ulaen, 1999).[15] The story goes that he was banished to the forest for being a bad son. While in the forest, the king of Heaven sent her daughter, Princess Konda, disguised first, as a sickly and stinking woman and next, as a woman with psoriasis, to test the character of the prince. In both instances, the prince welcomed and helped the princess in disguise. Upon seeing his good behavior, the king of Heaven offered her daughter to the prince for marriage, which the latter gladly accepted. They were told, however, by the king to leave Cotabato and find a place that will be indicated by signs of rains, lightning, and thunder. The couple left Cotabato, headed east and reached the island of Marulung (Balut), from there moved to Taghulandang, Ruang, Siau, and Karangetang but did not find the signs. It was in the mountain of Sahendarumang in the island of Sangihe or Tampung Lawo that they were welcomed with rain, lightning and thunder. It is here where they established the first kingdom of Sangihe. The residents gave Gumansalangi the name Vizier Medelu (which means jinn of thunder) and his wife, Princess Mekila (or princess of lightning) (Juda, 1995:109). In his old age, Mangunsalangi would return to and spend his last days in Mindanao. His youngest son, Meliku-Nusa went to Bolaang Mongondow and married a local princess. The eldest, Melintang-Nusa followed him to Cotabato and marry the daughter of the king of Tugis (South Cotabato). He would later go back to Sangir and became its second king and would rule in the area of Tabukan. In his old age, he too would go back to Mindanao. His descendants would later establish the various kingdoms in the Sangihe-Talaud group of islands.

In appreciating the significance of the hero, Gumansalangi, Barbara Andaya suggests that instead of interpreting him as a specific individual, it is best to look at him as a "representative of something larger – chiefdoms, ethnic groups, whole societies – and as vehicles for conveying meaningful messages about relevant relationships" (1993:39). The myth, therefore, could be apprehended as an affirmation or reaffirmation of Sangir-Talauds relation with Magindanao since time began. Mangunsalangi's journey to Sangir-Talaud Islands and his return to Mindanao in his old age evoke continuity rather than severance of relations, which mirrors the tendency of families in the area to move out to places but retain their connections with their ancestors through documentation of where one has established his family. Moreover, the myth provides unity to an otherwise fragmented kingdoms of Sangir-Talaud by implying common ancestry of all the kingdoms. On the other hand, the myth could also be an attempt to shore-up the prestige of the various kingdoms in the area by tracing lineage to a great Sultanate. In the mythological representation of the islands under Ternate's rule, Sangir-Talaud Islands and North Sulawesi are excluded; thus, they were never regarded as true part of Maluku (Andaya L., 1993:112).

The link from Cotabato to Sangir leads back to Sarangani Island when in mid-14th century, according to local history, a certain *Datu* Panurat from Tabukan-matua moved to the island to escape from Hinduism imposed by the Majapahit kingdom (Municipality of Sarangani, 1996; Hayase, Non & Ulaen, 1999:40-43).[16] He decided to settle and raise his clan in the island. The name of the islands, Sarangani and Balut, comes from the names of Panurat's two sons, Balud and Sarangani.[17] *Datu* Panurat actively traded with communities in Margos, Glan and along the Davao Gulf areas. He was a literate man and fluent in Arabic because he was able to write a tarsila. After Panurat's death,[18] his two sons became the leaders of the clan; while his brothers and sisters settled in Tugis (now South Cotabato), Mati, Davao

Oriental and Batulaki. This perhaps account for Laarhoven's note that the King of Tabukan has relatives in Kalangan and Mati Bay (1989:117).

Towards the end of 16th century, Dutch records show that Sarangani island was home to *Datu* Mangada, king of Kandahar (located on the northern part of Sangir Island), who also ruled over Tugis and Davao Gulf area.[19] His family had close relations with the Buayan kingdom. Mangada's ancestry is traced to Rajah Wagama who ruled Kandahar in 15th century and who was later succeeded by a Mindanao royalty, Sarib Mansyur, who is said to have introduced Islam in Sangihe ("Philipina, 2000).[20] He had a daughter named Fatima who married Sultan Achmad Mehegulangi from Mindanao. The union brought forth one son named Boaisang (Wuisang) who later became the first Sultan of Kendahe but ruled from Mindanao. Boaisang or Buisan is the father of Mangada and at the time of Kudarat, he was somewhere in the Davao Gulf region or in Tugis. It is said that the daughter of Buisan married Markus Dalore, a rajah from Tabukan who gave the state of Makiwulaeng as bride price ("Philipina, 2000). From then on, Kandahar was deemed to rule a part of Tabukan.

Kandahar and Tabukan's connection with Davao Gulf and Sarangani corroborates the genealogies of Sangils now living in the area.[21] Notable in the genealogies are the presence and movement of family members to settlements within the Davao Gulf and Saranggani Bay areas, such as Glan, Tugis, and Jose Abad Santos. Throughout generations, there were also intermittent marriages with people from Magindanao. This could be inferred as one way of expanding family relations, opening new territories, or maintaining influence in the area.

Intermarriage of the Sangirese with local kingdoms in the Davao Gulf region included even 'non-aligned' kingdoms like the Kalagans. This kingdom is not a tributary to Magindanao or Ternate Sultanate (Laarhoven, 1989:118). Local chiefs, however, such as 17th century King

Bessie Hossaru, ensures that provisions are available and prices are lower if Magindanao's leaders come to trade (Laarhoven, 1989:118). The genealogy of the current Kalangan or Kaagan *Datu* of Madaum in Davao del Norte traces their origin to a Sangir captive of Magindanao nobility, Kapitan Laut, who is married to a Kaagan (Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999:54). According to Non, the *Datu* of Madaum is one of the three original *Datu*s of Davao area (Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999:54). At present, there are two groups of Kalagan, the Christianized Kalagans and the Islamized Kaagans. The Spaniards must have been able to convert part of the Kalagans in the 1800s which was deemed as mere rumor in 1705 (Laarhoven, 1989:118).

Political Relations

While the genealogies show that Magindanao and the Sangir-Talauds have been in close relations for quite some time, it would only be at the beginning of the 17th century that historical accounts would show Magindanao enforcing influence in the Sangir-Talaud kingdoms. In 1625, Qudarat attacked Sarangani Islands and expelled *Datu* Mangada (Laarhoven, 1989:105), because of the island's strategic value to the expanding Magindanao sultanate. It is the east-west route from Sulu, Borneo and Sangihe to the Davao Gulf region, an excellent place for shipbuilding and repair, and source of beeswax (Laarhoven, 1986:47). Sarangani from then on became a tributary of Magindanao and no trade with foreigners was permitted without consent from the Sultan. Qudarat also made the island the warehouse for his trade goods. Barhaman, Qudarat's grandson, would fully take over the control of Davao Gulf and Sarangani during his reign. Dutch records show that there were about seventeen settlements in the Davao Gulf which were tributary to the Magindanao Sultanate in this area (Laarhoven, 1990:173).

At the time of the reign of Barhaman (around 1678),[22] according to Laarhoven, Sarangani Island, Davao Gulf settlements, and the Sangir-Talaud Islands comprised one of Magindanao's five spheres of influence (1989:169-174).[23] The other areas of influence included the: (1) settlements in Zamboanga Peninsula and Basilan, including the Subanons; (2) Iranuns and Badjaos residing along the coasts of Pulangi and Simoay Rivers and Lake Lanao; (3) communities along the Sarangani Bay and the Tirurays; (4) inland settlements in the Buayan area and the Manobos. Each of these spheres contributes to the Sultanate, either in goods or services, but not totally controlled by the Sultanate. This kind of arrangement may seem incoherent with modern concepts of state power, but coherence in this context is achieved through the principles of reciprocity, redistribution and exchange.

The Badjaus, for instance, took on a variety of sea-related roles acting as boat makers, messengers, tribute collectors, coast guards, and sometimes as interpreters or envoys. In times of perilous journeys on behalf of the Sultan, the Badjaos' children were taken care of by the Sultanate. Despite assuming these functions in the Sultanate, the Badjaus continued to roam the seas on their own and to regularly fish in the Moluccas and Celebes. While the Sultanate's relationship with the Manobos was purely trade-orientated, gold in exchange for cloth and the local chief only transacts with the Sultan.

Sultan Barhaman further extended his influence into Sangir through his marriage with Basing, the daughter of the first Sultan of Sangir, Makalindi, and Timbang Saribu (Saleeby, 1976:49).[24] Laarhoven mentions that Barhaman also had a queen, who was the sister of the *gugugu* (prime minister) of the King of Tabukan (1989:65). Whether or not they were the same woman, the marriage could be inferred as part of Barhaman's effort to expand Magindanao's influence in Sangir-Talaud kingdoms, which by this time have switched allegiance to the Dutch VOC. It could also be that

Barhaman was acting on the request of then Ternate Sultan Amsterdam to quell Dutch Christianization missions in the Sangir-Talaud Islands (Laarhoven, 1989:65). Barhaman was quite involved in Sangir issues because by 1680, the Dutch suspected him of interfering in Muslim affairs in the island. According to Laarhoven, the kinship and Islamic ties of Magindanao with Sangir is one of the reasons why the Dutch could not exercise paramount authority over the area (1989:65). It could also be possible that the Dutch did force their rule in the Sangir-Talaud areas so as not to antagonize Magindanao, which was their primary trading partner in the area during this period.

In another Magindanao narrative, Rajah Manalatan of Sangir, supposedly the brother of Basing who succeeded their father Makalindi, ceded Salibabo Island and part of Talaud Island in favor of his nephew, Sultan Manamir of Magindanao and thus, he was also known as Sultan of Sangir (Laarhoven, 1989:iii-iv; Forrest, 1971:320). There are no records however, of what transpired after this marriage and even of Barhaman's continuing influence in the island. It was, however, during Barhaman's rule that Muslim Sangirs escaping the Christianization of Sangir-Talaud islands were openly welcomed into the Magindanao Sultanate. These Sangirs escapees would form part of the present-day Sangil, one of the thirteen Muslim ethnic groups in Mindanao. In the local history of Sarangani Island, the Sangils were recorded as descendant of *Datu* Panurat (Municipality of Saranggani, 1996), which is partly true since they all share the same ancestry. A 1983 data shows that there are around 77,000 Sangils and they can be found in Balut Island, Sarangani Bay, Davao City, and coastal areas of Maasim, Maitum, Kiamba, and Glan, South Cotabato ("A Profile," 1987:35). By 1990, their population would decline considerably at 7,483, (Hayase, 2007:80) perhaps because of intermarriages and integration with other local groups, such as the Kalagans and Bl'aans, they have taken other identities. Their contemporary locations, however, were in earlier times also the destination areas of their ancestors.

Dutch sources suggest Magindanao's control over Sarangani Island was patchy. In 1688, the King of Kandahar ceded Sarangani Island, areas around Davao Gulf, and the eastern coast of Mindanao to the Dutch in exchange for military protection (Laarhoven, 1989:60; Majul, 1973:175). This was part of the effort of king to reclaim influence over the area from Magindanao. Around 1693-1695, Dutchmen reported to Barhaman the presence of the son of the King of Kandahar with a well-known Nakoda Abdul from Sangir in Sarangani Island and that they had a *pascedule* to Butuan. The Dutchmen were quite perplexed to find a son of the expelled king of the island taking a break in the area. The son mentioned Barhaman has usurped his father powers (Laarhoven, 1989:129). Majul (1973:175), perhaps because of limited information, assumed like the Dutch, that indeed Barhaman or Magindanao did not have control over the island.

The Dutch perspective on control and territory was, however, based on a different framework of territoriality, as noted by Laarhoven (1989:129). During this period, the island may be tributary of Magindanao, but it is not completely sealed off from interaction with other kingdoms, such as in the case of Kandahar. Moreover, the losing local ruling elite remain in his kingdom while paying homage to the center. This is evident in Barhaman's response to the Dutch report where he mentioned that during his grandfather's reign, *Datu* Buisan of Kandahar ruled on his grandfather's behalf on the Davao Gulf areas (Laarhoven, 1989:129). In another instance, during a request of Spaniards to build a fort in Sarangani, Barhaman apparently referred the Spaniards to *Datu* Buisan, the father of the King of Kandahar (Laarhoven, 1989:129). Laarhoven assumes that it was Barhaman's ploy to misled the Spaniards that the island is under a Sangir king and therefore, under Dutch protection, which the Spaniards would not dare face off with (1989:129-130). Towards the decline of the Magindanao Sultanate, the King of Kandahar again signed treaties with the Dutch over Sarangani to regain the island. The Dutch, as reported by Ileto, perhaps understanding the value of the island and to

counteract the Spanish re-entry in Mindanao, implanted a stone tablet with the initials V.O.C. and claim the island as part of Ternate (1971:26).

Amidst the interweaving of personal relations, economic interests and political pursuits, the preceding discussion shows that the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea has never acted as a boundary but rather a space of connections, networks, and exchange. These linkages are marked not only in the markets and ports but more so in myths and family narratives. Underlying the linkages and alliances built on trade and political maneuverings are histories woven into the personal and oral narratives that continue to be remembered by family members and folklore long after the pre-colonial port-polities are gone. These political dynamics, along with the historical linkages and ties in the Sulu-Sulawesi, were displaced by the colonial projects with the return of the Spanish in Mindanao and followed later on by the Americans.

Altering the Political Space: Colonial Projects in Mindanao and North Sulawesi

The return of Spain to Mindanao at the start of 18th century marked the reconfiguration of the political, economic and cultural relations in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, which were continued by its American successor. Through the use of diplomacy and military might, Spain completed the subdivision of the Sulu-Sulawesi region among the competing European powers in the area. With the subjugation of the two most powerful sultanates in the area, the historical network of Mindanao with its partners across the Sulu-Sulawesi was weakened and reoriented towards the economic and political centers of the colony. Spain's redefinition of the territorial basis of political authority in the area would lay the groundwork for the eventual dissolution of local rulers' traditional sources of power during American rule.

Spain's renewed engagement with Mindanao began by striking down regional trade, the lifeline of the Sultanates and settlements in the area, as they were redirected towards the commercial interests of the colony. The process started with Spain's re-establishment of the Zamboanga fort, strategically located at the channel where goods coming from China into Magindanao pass. Chinese junks were prevented by Spain from calling at Magindanao port (Ileto, 1971:10). This seriously weakened the economic base of the Magindanao Sultanate as it could no longer directly secure goods coming from China and was relegated to supplying rice to then expanding Sulu Sultanate in exchange for Chinese goods (McKenna, 1998:77). The Iranuns and Badjaos, who were two of the key allies of Magindanao, shifted to Sulu as their economic conditions begun to deteriorate. Some of the Badjaos moved their operation to Macassar (Ileto, 1971:10). The final erosion of Magindanao control over trade would happen as internal political rivalry and civil war engulfed the Sultanate, propitiously at the time of Spain's return to Mindanao.

The alliance that made Magindanao a powerful Sultanate in the area would crumble in 1730s as power struggles among heirs to the Sultanate erupted. The opportune time for Spain to intervene came when the Sultan of Magindanao requested protection against his rival powers. The occupation of Pollock Point, at the mouth of the Pulangi River, by the responding Spanish navy opened the doors to eventual occupation of the coastal kingdom of Magindanao (Ileto, 1971:8-10). By 1837, Magindanao in a treaty with Spain relinquished *de facto* control of trade at the Pulangi River and even the selection of rulers in the Sultanate (Ileto, 1971:13). This did not sit well with former tributaries, many of which repudiated their relationship with the Sultanate (Ileto, 1971:13). The Sultanate's sphere of influence was eventually reduced to immediate areas near the mouth of the Pulangi River. The final incorporation of Magindanao into the Spanish colony occurred in 1861 when it was renamed Cotabato and reduced as one of the five districts of the politico-military government of Mindanao. The

Sultanate's former realms of influence were now co-equals administratively, with Zamboanga and Davao (including Glan and Sarangani Bay settlements) comprising the two other districts in the southwestern/eastern sections of Mindanao. The other districts were Misamis and Surigao in the northwestern/eastern parts of Mindanao.

While the coastal kingdom of Magindanao capitulated relatively easily to Spain's colonial design, the inland Buayan kingdom, under the leadership of *Datu* Uto, waged fierce resistance against Spain. When Pollock Point was occupied by Spain and closed off Buayan's immediate access to the sea, it exploited its long familiar alternative route to Sarangani Bay. Buayan remained free of Spanish control until the late 19th century. In part because the Spanish belatedly realized that there was an alternative route to the sea from the upper settlements of Magindanao (Ileto, 1971:25) that negated their control of the mouth of the Pulangi. This alternative outlet for Buayan made the Sarangani area central to *Datu* Uto's campaign to maintain the economic support to its alliance and acquisition of arms.

The *datus* and traders displaced by naval campaigns in Sulu and occupation of Davao would converge in Sarangani Bay, thus providing Uto with additional sources of support for its anti-Spanish campaign (Ileto, 1971:26-27). This site of traditional commerce would be transformed into a large-scale site of "smuggling" and "piracy", as the Spanish authorities interpreted them to be, from Sulu to the Sangir archipelago and to British-controlled ports such as Singapore. To inhabitants of the Bay, however, this trade was between "commercial friends" (Ileto, 1971:26) and nothing extraordinary. Based on Spanish reports, Ileto notes the large movements of Chinese and Christian traders, including foreign merchants, to Glan and Sarangani Bay to take advantage of the commerce (1971:27). One report mentioned an Indian trader with commercial links in Davao moving opposite Sarangani Island with one hundred Sangir Moro families (Ileto,

1971:27). Thus, while the coastal kingdom of Magindano saw it trade relations reoriented towards Manila, the Buayan kingdom for a time relished the relations of former traditional Magindanao allies and external trade with Malay and Indonesian commercial worlds (Ileto, 1971:28). Uto would eventually be defeated by Spain breaking the alliance he had with local chiefs, ending the slave trade, and gaining control of Glan and Sarangani Bay.

The Sangir-Talauds continued to visit the Sarangani Islands despite the fall of Magindanao as reflected in the accounts of Spanish friars around the end of nineteenth century:

> Every year people from Talao come to these islands. They are peaceful and industrious and come to sell textiles and various kinds of mats. Their bancas are as big as schooners and have a special shape, but they don't dare enter the bays of Sarangani and Davao because they are afraid of the Moros and the Manobos. When Father More wrote about this, it was only a few years earlier that the Moros had captured one of their *pancos* in Mangkili, killing the crew with the exception of one man who was able to escape from the carnage and was later baptized in Davao shortly before the arrival of the Jesuits in this district. During the months of September and October, Talao seamen used to sail along the coasts from Culaman up to Cape San Agustin. In 1884 Father Pastells saw two of their large pancaos which arrived at Hinatuan in bad shape, after being blown by thither by the *tarangin* or southwind. They had been coasting up to Pundaguitan to get at the proper altitude for their return trip by making use of the first northwind. Upon leaving the *reduccion* of Hinatuan, the helmsman of one of those pancos promised the inspector that upon their next voyage they would bring some families along to settle here, because due to prolonged drought they suffered hunger for most of the year (Schreurs, 1998:42).

There is not much historical information as to what happened to the Sangir-Talaud settlements in Sarangani Bay and along the Davao Gulf areas. What could be surmised based on the genealogies is that they became part of the Muslim indigenous groups in the area and were later

classified as part of the Sangil community. A number of the present *datus* in the area trace their lineage to Sangir. The demarcation of the boundary between the Dutch and Spanish territories disconnected them from their kinfolks across the border. With the Christianization of the Sangir-Talaud archipelago by the Dutch, this disconnection heightened. This division was permanently fixed later in the formation of the postcolonial nation-state, as the Sangils and Sangirs take on the national identities of their respective nation-states, as Filipinos and Indonesians, respectively.

On the eve of American take-over of the Philippines, Spain had succeeded in reconfiguring the relations of Magindanao with its neighbors across the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea. The political alliances were now gone. While the large scale inter-island commerce has been reduced to a much smaller scale, Spain was not fully able to control its borders in Mindanao. Towards the end of Spanish rule in Mindanao, Glan and the Sarangani Bay maintained their reputation as places for smugglers and traders of goods, such as opium and firearms (Warren, 1981:130).

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Dutch-Spanish border in Mindanao, a similar process of administrative reorganization has taken place in the Sangir-Talaud Islands and North Sulawesi after the Batavia (Jakarta)-based Dutch government has taken control of the area. The vast zone of the Ternate Sultanate was now subdivided into administrative territories. The Sangir-Talaud Islands were initially placed under the jurisdiction of the governor of Maluku and later become part of the residency of Manado. The kingdoms were transformed into administrative units with the local rajas becoming its leaders (Ulaen, 2003:81). The varied networks of trade in the archipelago were now all directed towards Batavia. As these networks were organized into a variety of layers – from the network of smaller islands to regional networks of trade, like those based in Manado and Ternate, and then, eventually to Batavia, those at the margins were less able to reap the benefits of trade. The case of Sangir-Talaud

Islands, which in earlier times were able to freely trade with varied centers both in Sulawesi and Mindanao, was now forced to link with Manado. Ulaen notes that this led to the marginalization of the Sangir-Talaud Islands, a process which continues until the present (2003:160).

Conclusion

The pre-colonial space of the modern-day border region of Southeastern Mindanao and North Sulawesi was characterized by fluidity and interlocking relations either through trade, intermarriages, or politics. As Lapian (2003) pointed out, it was not only a political-economic space, but also a socio-cultural unit overriding the boundaries set forth by colonialism (3). Inter-island commerce was extensive as recorded in historical accounts, as well as, the inter-island familial relations and exchanges as demonstrated in the interlaced genealogies and folk narratives. Mobility of people and goods, therefore, were familiar scenes in this maritime region. Port-polities, like Magindanao, freely welcomed and sought out a variety of peoples to serve their human resource and trading needs. The openness of the Magindanao polity is perhaps best captured in Sultan Barhaman's letter to Governor van der Duyn in 1693 in which he state that "the people of Magindanao certainly are known under one name but consists of many nations" (Laarhoven, 1989:109).

The subject border region of this study was in fact the "border region" of the Sultanates of Ternate and Magindanao. In contrast to modern notions of border areas, however, the kingdoms in Sarangani Island, Sangir-Talaud archipelago and Davao Gulf areas in pre-colonial period were political centers in their own right and able to chart their own political relations. The border did not mean exclusive domination of one particular powerful Sultanate but rather crossroads of interlacing alliances. It meant more of a periphery because of its distance from the center but did not evoke territorial limits or ends of the kingdom. The Sangir-Talauds were

among the indigenous settlers of this border region. Caught in the crossroads of competing powers and centers, their history, politics, and kinship would crisscross the seas, from Magindanao to Ternate, at the very least.

The re-entry of Spain in the Mindanao reconfigured the organization of traditional political space in the area. Magindanao's trading network with its allied polities in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea was cut-off and redirected towards colonial economic interests. The political structure defined by alliances and personal relations gave way to a new political structure defined according to administrative territorial units tied up to the central government of the colony in Manila. The political subdivision of the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea among the three colonial powers in the area – the Dutch, British, and Spanish, led to the dislocation and separation of communities whose lives bisect these territories, such as the Sangir-Talauds who were alienated from their relations in Mindanao.

The Sulu-Suluwesi Sea, however, remained a zone of contact and the ancient maritime highways continued to be crossed with scant regard for the territorial trappings of the colonial projects. Colonial mindsets would not acknowledge the traditional fluidity of relations so that the terms "piracy" and "smuggling" came into existence to denote the new rules established by the colonial state. These terms, likewise, denote the fragile hold of the colonial state on its boundaries, a condition that continued during the American and postcolonial periods.

Chapter III
Sangir-Talaud Sojourners and Settlers in Mindanao: 1900-2009

The entry of the Americans into Mindanao in 1900 ushered in a new era during which the Sangir-Talauds found their way back into Southeastern Mindanao. This time, however, their entry took place within the framework of the modern nation-state system. While previous crossings of the sea were quite free and without attendant transformation in social and political position, within the new state system border crossers had to inevitably engage with the state and its agents and deal with the social and legal structures of immigration and citizenship. The Sangir-Talauds in Mindanao are now classified in state parlance as Indonesians when in earlier times they were simply the Sangirs or Talauds. The Sangir-Talauds continue to move in and out of Mindanao but they now occupy a liminal position in Mindanao as illegal entrants and non-citizens of the state. The Americans introduced immigration and customs procedures redefining rules of access and passage but they and the postcolonial Philippine state did not succeed totally in sealing off the border. The Sangir-Talauds defied the borders and instead took advantage of what it could offer to better their lives. The first section maps out the extent of dispersion of Sangir-Talauds in eight provinces in southeastern Mindanao. The second section examines how the border is redefined as the Sangir-Talauds built their lives around it. The third section looks at issues contemporary migrant settlers face, their marginality, and how they make sense of being immigrants.

Documenting the Undocumented

The demographic profile of the Sangir-Talauds in Southeastern Mindanao is based on a household survey and interviews conducted between 2002-2005 in seven municipalities (Glan, Sarangani, Isulan, Esperanza, Norallah) and cities (Davao, General Santos) in Mindanao. Of the 204 respondents, 72% were male heads of households, 26% female spouses, and 1% oldest members of the household. Around 14% were Filipino spouses of Indonesian nationals. More than half of them were between the ages of 19-44. Thirty-eight percent of the respondents were born in Indonesia and almost all of them hail from the Sangir-Talaud archipelago.

Map 3. Documented locations of Indonesians in Mindanao

There is a paucity of available data on the number of Sangir-Talauds or Indonesians in Mindanao. From the time their presence became a national issue in the 1960s, no comprehensive mapping has been done by the Philippine government. Local government offices also do not have accurate data. The lack of data is partly because the Indonesians have not been of major concern, except in times of political and security concerns and was also due to the lack of state capacity to gather data and monitor its peripheries. Estimates given in the 1960s are surprisingly similar to estimates forty years later. A 2000 survey of the Philippine Bureau of Immigration (BI) shows that there are at least 6,869 Indonesians in Mindanao (see table 1). While the survey by the Indonesian Consulate in Davao City on the same year (August 2000), reflects a slightly higher population of 8,070 and it did not cover some of the areas surveyed by BI. The discrepancy in the BI data is partly due to it being based only on Indonesians who showed up during the survey in the interview sites and did not involve house-to-house mapping. Both population surveys, however, are significantly lower than the estimate by local officials and press, which is 10,000 to 15,000 ("Indons make", 2004: A17). This estimate, on the other hand, does not differ considerably from the estimate of 12,000 made by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1965. The variety in estimates stems from a variety of factors, aside from the state's fleeting interest and lack of capacity to monitor the border. The Indonesian are widely dispersed geographically, some of these areas are difficult to reach. Some of the Indonesians are also very mobile because of their work, such as the seafarers or itinerant farm hands. There was a general impression during the interviews with local government and immigration officials that the population could be around 20,000.

The Indonesians are spread quite widely in at least 25 municipalities and cities in eights provinces in Southeastern Mindanao (see Map 3 and Table 1); a significant number of which are located in the municipalities of Jose Abad Santos, Sarangani, Glan, Isulan, and General Santos City. The

municipalities of Sarangani, Jose Abad Santos, and Glan are the usual entry points and traditional settlement areas of Indonesians, thus explaining the large concentration of migrants in these areas.

Table 1. Population of Indonesians in Mindanao by Province, Municipality/ City

Province, Municipality/City	Bureau of Immigration	Indonesian Consulate
1. Davao City and Davao del Norte		
a. Davao City	220	397
b. Samal	26	
c. Tagum	23	
2. Davao del Sur		
a. Sarangani	1,838	2,876
b. Don Marcelino	31	
c. Sta. Maria	38	137
d. Malita	2	382
3. Davao Oriental		
a. Gov. Genoroso	143	
b. Lupon	10	
c. Sigaboy	104	
d. Mati	40	
4. North Cotabato		
a. Kabacan	70	184
b. Kidapawan	39	
5. South Cotabato		
a. Norala	204	
b. Banga	100	
c. Tupi	116	
d. General Santos City	679	656
e. (Brgy. Bukid and Dukay)	34	
6. Sarangani		
a. Glan	2,157	2,306
b. Maitum	40	
c. Malapatan	86	
d. Kiamba	257	417
e. Alabel	35	
f. Maasim	33	
g. (Brgy. Kiogam)	112	
7. Sultan Kudarat		
a. Isulan	125	715
b. Esperanza	276	
Total	**6,869**	**8,070**

Sources: 2000 Indonesian National Survey, Bureau of Immigration, Davao City; 2000 Daftar Pemukiman WNI di Wilaya Kerja, KJRI Davao City. The municipality affiliation of some barangays could not be ascertained.

Mindanao and the American Colonization Program

The Americans occupied Mindanao at the beginning of the twentieth century. Under their rule, the incorporation of Mindanao into the Philippine polity was completed. The Muslims again vigorously resisted such efforts but with a fragmented community, they had little recourse but to follow the new colonial design. Mindanao was politically subdivided into administrative territories – barangay, municipalities, districts, provinces – by the Americans to facilitate the governance of the area. This would finally erode the rule of traditional chiefdoms in the area (Abinales, 2000b:207). The establishment of immigration and customs rules and offices in Mindanao paved the way for the 'organized' flow of goods and people, failure to comply meant serious legal repercussions (Abinales, 2000b:207). The emergence of new and young leaders, albeit most of them descendants of the great Sultans of Mindanao, educated and bred in an American system and more inclined towards working with the center inevitably escalated the integration of Mindanao into the political realm of the colony (Abinales, 2000a:60). The sea as a border began to take shape as the Americans started to configure the colony's maritime limits. The borders, however, remained porous to "piracy" and "smuggling," as evidenced by foreign goods that found its way into the markets and stores of Mindanao (Abinales, 2000b:223).

Mindanao was represented by the Americans as the "frontier" of the Philippine state, "the land of promise and unlimited opportunity" (Pelzer, 1948:127). Wernstedt and Simkins note that the area was "isolated from the principals centers of Spanish activities and the island failed to participate to any significant degree in the economic and political development of the Philippines" and failed to develop significantly and increase its population (1965:84-85). An imagery that is patently flawed considering Mindanao's central role in the pre-colonial trade of the Sulu-Sulawesi but nonetheless it was effectively used by the Americans to justify

its program of development and settlement of Mindanao starting in 1900. To encourage development and migration, the Public Land Act was implemented in 1903 which permitted the sale or lease of public lands (Wernstedt & Simkins, 1965:87). Enterprising American servicemen and a few European and Japanese investors began transforming the vast plains of Mindanao into agricultural plantations. By 1909, according to Corsino, there were around "40 plantations, ranging from 100 to 1,024 hectares or more, comprised of 2,670,000 hills of hemp and 122,000 coconut trees" (1981:105). The plantations soon spread to coastal areas of Cotabato and Sarangani Bay (Corsino, 1981:107). Despite the success of most plantations, Mindanao still failed to attract migrants and workers to the extent that there was a severe labor shortage in the abaca plantations (Villanueva, 1956:47). The Americans decided to actively encourage migration by establishing agricultural colonies between 1913 and 1917, six in the province of Cotabato (including Glan) and one in the province of Lanao (Pelzer, 1948:129). The colonies failed to attract migrants because of ill-chosen sites and the settlers lacked farming experience (Pelzer, 1948:1320. By 1939, the Commonwealth government established the National Land Settlement Project (NLSA), which oversaw the creation of four settlements (Polomolok, Marbel, Tupi, and Lagao) in the Koronadal Valley, the pre-colonial domain of the Buayan kingdom. Under NLSA, each settler was provided with a six hectare farm, access to credit and technical support to enable them start a new life. The NLSA task was not completed because of World War II. Its considerable success, however, encouraged the government to continue the program after the war (Abinales, 2000a:97). According to Wernstedt and Simkins, "the total cultivated area of Mindanao increased approximately from two million acres in 1948 to more than 4.2. million acres in 1960" (1965:102).

The Sangir-Talauds took part in this American-led development of Mindanao, but as silent settlers, unrecorded and undocumented. The Sangir-Talauds came in the early 1900s and joined in the "colonization" of

Mindanao as farm hands, coconut planters, and settlers. Many became "pioneers" by themselves as they cleared lands for farms and plant the first sets of abaca, coconuts and even pineapples in Mindanao. They followed the Filipino settlers as they opened up lands and built new lives in these settlements. Villano-Campado (1989), in her study of the NLSA settlement program in Koronadal Valley, noted that the pre-war Filipino settlers met the Sangir-Talauds when they came in Cotabato (8). Most of their present locations were historically the pioneer settlements in Mindanao – Glan, Cotabato, and Koronadal Valley areas. Many of these pioneers remained and spent their lives in Mindanao illegally, but not necessarily unwanted and unwelcomed.

The Sangir-Talauds Return to Mindanao: Reclaiming and Redefining the Border

The border as stated in the first chapter not only divides political territories but also areas of opportunity and restriction. It highlights, among others, economic disparities and better life prospects. Border peoples exploit this opportunity by building their lives and livelihoods around what the border offers. In turn, giving shape to the margins as sites of opportunities and exchange rather than as sites of control and division. Without enforcement and control, the border becomes even captive to the interests of those who cross them. The case of the Sangir-Talauds is illustrative. At the beginning of the twentieth century, they were faced with drought, epidemics, and shortage of agricultural land (Henley, 2005:154-161). Aside from the natural disasters that plague the archipelago, it could be argued that the economy of the area has deteriorated considerably after traditional maritime trade was cut-off. These Islands whose primary economy was based on the sea trade were now forced to sustain a growing population on a limited area of land. With the lack of better options, the tendency is to move to other areas to find a living.

These factors accelerated the movement of young men from the Sangir-Talaud area moving to escape constricting family ties and thus further depriving the island of the needed human resource (Henley, 2005:161). Many of the migrants found work in European plantations in Minahasa and the North Moluccas. Others found their way to Mindanao through familiar patterns of mobility by traditional boats and in large groups. Migration continued into the middle of twentieth century and did not slow down even during the 1930s economic depression (Henley, 2005:161). The movement to Mindanao persists up to the present.

The first recorded entry of the Sangir-Talauds during the American period was in 1918 when Calunao Pangelawan, an Indonesian, came into Balut Island to proselytize among the Sangirs and Bl'aans (Municipality of Sarangani, 1996). It could be inferred that there was a sizeable number of Sangir-Talauds in the island to merit a missionary's work (assuming all converts were migrants and Sangir-Talauds). An American exploratory mission in Balut Island in 1902 noted that were a few Sangils in the area (Corcino, 1998:117). Whether these are the new entrants to area or the Sangir Muslims of yesteryears is not certain. Pangelawan's work would be continued later by Benjamin and Herman Mahaling.[25] Sangir residents of the Island believe that some of their kinfolk have been on the island perhaps one or two generations ahead of Pangelawan and Mahaling (Cullamar-Tan, 1989:93). It is interesting to note that many, however, would have vague, or no, knowledge at all of the pre-colonial relations between Mindanao and the Sangir-Talaud Islands. Thus, unknowingly, many retrace the footpaths of their ancestors in Mindanao as they seek work and livelihood. In turn, they established new paths for their kinfolks who followed them later.

The age-old skills of Sangir-Talauds in coconut farming became handy when they moved to Mindanao. The pioneer settlers in the Sarangani and Balut Islands were the first to clear the lands and planted

them with coconut trees. On Sarangani Beach in Balut Island, residents said one could determine how long they have been in the area based on the age of coconut trees that dot their beachside church. While legally they were not allowed to own land, many of these pioneer settlers became big landowners. Raharto (2000) reported that around 35% of the families who lived in Kawio, Kawaluso, and Marore Islands owned coconut trees in Balut and Sarangani Islands (240). Cahangang Layang, for instance, owned around 33 hectares of coconut plantation in Sarangani (Cullamar-Tan, 1989:170-171). While Yanis, in an interview in 2002, said his family used to own more than 20 hectares but was taken away from him by a local Filipino resident when issues of rightful ownership propped up in the 1960s. He said the land was given to his father by a native Bl'aan. Coconut farming and copra production remain a primary source of agricultural income by the Municipality of Sarangani. It continues as well as one of the primary occupations of the Sangir-Talauds in the island.

Image 1. Residences of Sangir-Talud settlers in Patirang, Balut Island with coconut plantations in the background.

Moreover, a number of Sangir-Talaud settlers would assume political roles, albeit within the village level, particularly in the Sarangani and

Balut Islands. Herman Mahaling and Jonathan Pareda were appointed as barangay councilors by special dispensation from the Philippine Commonwealth government, while two of Mahaling's sons served during World War II as USAFE members (Cullamar-Tan, 1989:173, 176-178). While Layang served as "teniente del barrio" or barangay chief for ten years (Cullamar-Tan, 1989:170-171). Others would take odd jobs, such as Herman Timpumesa, who worked as guide for visiting Americans in Balut Island in the 1940s.[26]

The Sangir-Talauds would also be linked with the lives of Spanish "pioneers" who heeded the call of the Americans. The daughter of Calunao Pangilawan married Venancio de Arce, a Spanish journalist and later became the 'presidente' (mayor) of Sarangani or Balut (Cullamar-Tan, 1989, 174-175).[27] According to descendants of Don Tranquilino Ruiz, who led the first settlement in Glan, their grandfather and even some of his neighbors had Sangir househelpers.[28] There is also a rumor among the old residents of General Santos City that the one of the Olarte brothers, who owned vast tracts of land in General Santos City and Sarangani Island, married an Indonesian with Dutch ancestry. One of the Filipino seafarers, who used to work for a fishing company in the city, said that the Olartes had families and relatives in the Sangir Islands. Rumors perhaps, but nonetheless, reflect the interlinked histories of migrants – Filipinos, Spanish and Sangir-Talauds – in Mindanao.

The factors that would drive the early Sangir-Talauds to Mindanao were not significantly different to later border crossers. Around sixty-eight percent of Indonesian-born respondents for the household survey conducted in 2002 said that they came to find work and better life (see Table 2). Some came on their own, while others brought their family or joined relatives who decided to give life in Mindanao a try. There were also those who were encouraged by stories of good life and success by earlier migrants in Mindanao. Alex Bohan recounts in 1972 hearing friends from Balult Island

visiting Sangir saying: "life is better in the Philippines. Unlike here, we have better opportunities there and we could buy things we want because almost everything is affordable" (Tiu, 2006:3). Despite his father's strong objection, Alex took the risk and followed his friends to Balut.

Table 2. Distribution of Respondents by Reasons for Migration



Visits from Sangir-Talaud to Mindanao are also quite common. Ruben Makausi, who came in 1968, wanted to discover whether what was said about Mindanao was true.[29] Migration will also be induced through regular trips back home and visits by families and friends from home. Some of these visits led to permanent settlement. Yunita for instance, met her husband while visiting in 2000 and has not gone back to Sangir since then.[30]

Aside from economic pursuits, Mindanao also attracted young Indonesians to study in local universities and schools. As early as the 1930s, young Indonesians were enrolled in schools in Mindanao (Asmardi, 1998: 13). One of these students is the grandparent of Mayor Alex Wangkay (or popularly known as the singer Zander Khan) of the Municipality of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur, who came in 1938 to study and settled in Mindanao.

The border also became convenient escape routes for Indonesians in times of conflict and trouble. In 1999, Christian families in Halmahera,

North Maluku fled to Glan and General Santos to avoid the violent conflict between Muslims and Christians. One of these escapees was, in fact, a returnee to Glan having decided to move to Halmahera a year before the war. At the height of the East Timor conflict, four East Timorese refugees landed in Mindanao through the route from North Sulawesi and Sangir-Talaud Islands (Cabusao, 1999:12).

Not all those who cross the border from Sangir-Talaud archipelago, however, decide to stay in Mindanao; many moves back and forth and maximize the benefits of both sides of the border. The expression "perut di Philipina, kaki di Indonesia" (literally, one's stomach is in the Philippines, while one's foot is planted in Indonesia) best captures the lives of shuttle traders and migrants in this border region. The residents of the contested island of Palmas,[31] for instance, sells their marine and copra produce to General Santos City and Davao and their earnings in turn are used to buy basic commodities, which are comparatively lower than those sold in the nearest market in Talaud Island or Manado (Layuck, 2001). Trade in earlier times was conducted through barter but because of the fluctuation in the copra prices it became unpopular. The proximity of the archipelago to Mindanao has made residents dependent on basic goods from Mindanao, such as rice, sugar, coffee and other daily needs. To a large extent, the economy of the island is organized towards Mindanao rather than Indonesia's centers of commerce in North Sulawesi. This explains why the Philippine currency is commonly used in Palmas, rather than the Indonesian rupiah.

Cross-border trade is also a main source of livelihood for a number of shuttle traders in a number of islands in Sangir-Talaud archipelago. Household goods from Philippines are familiar items in local markets in Tahuna, Marore, and Tina-kareng. These markets do not only serve local clients but also resellers which trade the products to markets in mainland North and South Sulawesi. One local newspaper reported that Philippine

products reach as far Jakarta and Surabaya, where they fetch a price four times higher than in Sangir markets ("Berburu Rupiah," 2006). These traders who ply back and forth to Mindanao also serve as sources of news from home and maintain linkages across the sea.

There are also families who shuttle between Mindanao and Indonesia, whose children studies in Mindanao but earn a living in Indonesia. The Manabong family, for instance, are based in Mindanao during school days and on breaks, returns home to fish and do business in Tahuna (Santosa & Setyahadi, 2009). It is said that it is more profitable to fish in Indonesia than in Mindanao because the catch is much greater at a much shorter period in the sea. The quality of education is the primary reason why they make the travel to Mindanao. At the Manabong home, it is common for the children to use five different languages: English, Tagalog, Visayan, Indonesian, and Sangir.

The ease in the mobility of the Sangir-Talauds to Mindanao is facilitated by the lack or absence of real maritime border control from the American colonial period to the present. Like their ancestors, the Sangir-Talauds in the beginning of the twentieth century crossed to Mindanao using traditional sailboats, such as *perahu* and *bote*. If the wind is going northwest, it would take around two to three days to complete the voyage from the Sangir-Talaud area to the nearest islands in southeastern Mindanao. Otherwise, it would take a week for the whole trip, such as what is described below by Pilipus Ase, who along with other 30 males, travelled in 1949 from Talaud to Cape San Agustin:

> If there is wind, then the trip takes two days and two nights; but if there is no wind, then we just float (*lutaw-lutaw*) on the sea, and it might take one week. We do not use the oars because we just wait for the wind. It is very tiring to use the oars as our destination was very far (Tiu, 2006:5-6).

The introduction of motorized boat shortened the trip, such as the journey from Sangir to Balut Island to about three to four hours ride. When commercial shipping between North Sulawesi and Mindanao became active, some migrants would hop in commercial fishing boats and enjoy a free ride to General Santos City, the main port of call in southeastern Mindanao for most commercial ships.

Most of the migrants enter Mindanao through the twin islands of Balut and Sarangani, Glan, Cape San Agustin, and Jose Abad Santos. In recent years, however, General Santos City has been added as a key entry point. One family in Samal Island said they navigated directly to the island from Sangir. From these varied points, the Sangir-Talauds move to areas where they could find jobs and more often, moving several times during their lifetime.

In earlier periods, the Sangir-Talauds would often sail to Mindanao in groups of 20 to 30 as narrated in the account below:

> Since 1912, they have been coming sporadically to the Philippines on their sailboats, each with a capacity of from 10 to 20 persons. They usually come during the period from July to December when the southern Mindanao weather is favorable. They arrive in groups of about 40 persons, each with a leader and an interpreter who knows English or a local dialect. With favorable strong winds, they easily negotiate the sea between Marore Island and Sarangani Islands, a distance of 40 nautical miles in a matter of four to six hours. From Sarangani, they proceed to Glan or Kiamba in Cotabato or to the coastal towns, along the Davao Gulf (Espino, 1952:3)

Alex Bohan relates the same experience when he came in 1972. He said he traveled together with twenty other people using a *kumpit* (traditionally, boat fitted with sails but are now installed with motor), which took them two weeks to sail because of bad weather (Tiu, 2006).

Males are usually the first one to move out first and followed later by their families and friends and sometimes, whole families moving in a boatload or two (Cullamar-Tan, 1989:81-94). In the 2002 survey, around 74% of the Indonesia-born respondents were male and single at the time of their entry, while the rest came with their families. Tauhar arrived in Glan when he was eight months old with his whole family in 1967.[32] After establishing themselves in the area, family, friends and kinfolk joins them. This is quite evident in the clustering of migrants according to kinship or common origin-village, particularly in Sarangani and Balut Islands. As Cullamar-Tan has observed in late 1980s and which remains true in 2002, the sitio Pakeluaso in Balut are home to people from Kawaluso, a small island north of Sangir; while most come from Marore in Sitio Sarangani (1989:94).

In most instances of border crossings, very few of migrants will carry passports or even border crossing cards. From 1900s to around the late 1950s, the Sangir-Talauds freely entered Mindanao without worrying about immigration procedures or rules. In some instances during this period, the leaders of boats carrying Indonesians would have a letter coming from their local government official stating the purpose of their visit, such as the one below:

> Las Palmas
> September 15, 1946
>
> To whom it may concern:
>
> This is to certify that Paul Terengganun together with 46 other men aboard sailboat "Sumbala" wish to barter at Davao City about 15 days. Their products are mats and little copra.
>
> Yours truly,
>
> (Sgd.) J.P. Lantaa
> Mayor of Palmas (Espino, 1952:3)

An immigration agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines was signed in 1956 which allowed residents of the border region to stay or trade across the border for 30 days by presenting a border-crossing card (see Chapter IV). Despite such procedures, however, most migrants from Sangir-Talaud were "undocumented." Eighty-five percent of survey respondents revealed they did not have any travel documents with them when they moved to Mindanao. While only thirteen percent said they have passports and two percent with border crossing cards. These documents are barely significant among the respondents as not one of them experienced being questioned about their lack of documents either by local police in their area or even by officers of border crossing stations.

Life in the Margins

The border may have no walls or guards but together with the institution of citizenship, its power to classify those who belong or not in the nation-state becomes a potent force in relegating those who cross illegally in the margins, with no rights and space. Illegal border crossers, however, are active agents in this process as they find ways to overcome the restrictions of illegality and lead productive lives.

The issue of illegality among the Sangir-Talauds did not come up until the 1950s, as will be discussed in the next chapter. In their everyday interactions with Filipino communities, their presence was not much an issue as well. As illegal migrants, however, they are one of the most marginalized in the state. Despite this, many Sangir-Talauds have integrated fairly well and the border region of Mindanao has become their home. They have well adapted to the local culture and lifestyle. In General Santos City, for instance, "karaoke" singing is quite common on weekends, a known favorite pastime of Filipinos. Most of them speak the local languages fluently; some even are multi-lingual.

Education and Social Mobility

Very few of the Sangir-Talauds, in all age groups, completed primary and secondary education as reflected in Table 3. University graduates are rare. As illegal migrants, many of the migrant families do not have access to education. They could not enroll their children in Philippine schools since they are required to submit birth records of children and residence certificates of parents. Most Indonesians do not register their children upon birth for fear of being identified as illegal settlers and for lack of information on the process. Some Indonesians though are able to enroll their children in Philippine schools by using fake documents. One parent in Norallah said he registered during the 1998 election so he could get a voter's certificate, which he used as proof of residence when he enrolled his children.

Table 3. Distribution of Respondents by Level of Education



Access to education is further compounded by the capacity of parents to send their children to school. With most families not having regular source of income, the education of their children becomes a least priority. In response to this problem, the Indonesian Consulate established a number of Indonesian schools in several areas. The quality of education though is way beyond standard such that Grade 9 graduates of Indonesian schools are

classified only as grade 2 students in Philippine schools. Classes are held three times a week and 4 hours a day. Students from all levels share one classroom and at times, the same lessons. The teachers are also not well trained.

Image 2. Children of Sangir-Talaud settlers attending a primary school supported by the Indonesian Consulate in Davao City.

Work and Employment

Lacking with the necessary education, many Sangir-Talauds are consigned to manual work throughout their life and one of the poorest of the poor in Mindanao. Of the 281 respondents and family members who reported they have work, around 43% are farmers, laborers, and rice mill workers (see Table 4). There is a small community of Sangir-Talauds working in a big multinational farm in Tupi. A number of these farmers started as workers for the early Filipino settlers during the American colonization program filling in the scarce labor resource. Some would be able to develop a very good relation with their employers and end up as trusted caretakers of farms, rice mills and coconut plantations. For example, the Sangir care taker of a rice mill in Esperanza, Isulan have worked there for 31 years. All of the rice mills and farms visited between

2002 and 2005 in Isulan, Davao, Norallah, and Ezperanza were managed and manned solely by Sangir-Talaud migrants. The Sangir-Talauds are known for being obedient, reliable and apolitical employees. One village councilor in Glan, who would not want to be named, said he worries more when the Sangirs interact with other Filipino employees because they adapt their bad work ethics.

Table 4. Distribution of Respondents by Type of Work



Brama Ricardo's story is a good example of this case.[33] He has been working for ten years as tenant of a three hectare coconut plantation in Samal, an island across Davao City. Since his employer does not reside in the area, he takes care of everything, including sending his employer's share of the income from copra sale through a friend in the island. Early in 2008, his employer sold the land to a Filipino based in Tagum, Davao del Sur, which is a few hours' drive south of Davao City. He was kept as the tenant and maintained the same arrangement even though he only met his new employer a few times. In Achmat Sanduka case, because of his good relations with his employer, he was allowed to build a house in his employer's property in Gen. Santos City. It has been the family's home for quite some time now. His wife maintains a small store in front of their house.

Image 3. A bunkhouse-turned-family residences for Sangir-Talaud rice mill workers in Norallah, South Cotabato.

Life is tough in the rice mills and small commercial farms. Aside from the seasonal nature of work, migrants are dependent on the generosity of the owner. The common set-up in the rice mills is that migrants are allowed to build houses or occupy the bunk houses within the compound of rice mills. The bunkhouse, composed of 3-6 individual rooms, measuring around 5x5 meters, was initially meant for workers staying for the harvest season. It was common to find a family occupying or single workers sharing a room designed for one person. The care taker oversees the overall management of the compound. This set-up allows the owner a steady and on-site supply of workers. During the planting season, most of the migrants work in the farms of their employer or nearby farms. By harvest time, they take turns in harvesting and manning the rice mills, which entails working until midnight. On lean months, some of the male family members find temporary work in the fishing industry or as independent fishermen. They earn around P2,500 (A$63)[34] for around two months during the harvest season and around P500 (A$13) per month the rest of the year. Others would save the rice grain they received as payment for farm work to see them through the lean months. In dire times, many would opt to take a loan from their employer to be paid come harvest time.

Aside from farming, around 40% of respondents are small-time fishermen earning around P1,000-2,000 (A$25-50) per month. While a small percentage (7%)[35] have found employment in the multi-million dollar tuna industry based in General Santos City, mainly composed of younger generations or recent migrants. Based on a Philippine-Indonesian inter-government agreement, at least thirty percent of the crew of vessels fishing in Indonesian waters must be Indonesians. These are mostly filled in by migrants based in Mindanao, who takes on a variety of roles in the industry. Some work on major shipping boats supplying fish to tuna canneries; while others work for pump boat operators mainly catching yellow fin tuna meant for processing plants or export. Migrants who are able to speak Indonesian fluently are hired as interpreters, particularly in vessels that dock in Indonesian ports or fish in Indonesian waters. There are reports of migrants employed by small time operators who do not have the necessary papers to fish in Indonesian waters. Popularly known as two-flag ships, once they are in Indonesian waters, they fly the Indonesian flag and the Indonesian crew takes on the lead. The income of these seafarers is highly variable, averaging around P4,000 (A$100) per month. Their income depends on their sharing arrangement between the fishing company or pump boat owner and the crew, computed based on the total value of the fish haul less the cost of food and petrol. The Philippines and Indonesia have agreed on a new fishing consortium in March 2009 but have yet to firm up the details.

The Sangir-Talauds also find work as sales ladies, housekeepers, drivers, office clerks, and buy and sell businessmen. According to Non, the Matutum Hotel of Gen. Santos City were mostly staffed by Sangir-Talaud migrants in the 1970s and 80s.[36] At one time, the city health center had an Indonesian nurse.

Even with their low income many Sangir-Talauds prefer to stay in Mindanao. Here at least, they say, they have work and earn no matter how

small it is. For many farmers and fishermen, particularly those who have been in Mindanao for long, shared that they have been used to the life here and going back to Indonesia would mean starting over all again. For a number of migrants, they survive by moving from one place to another and hopping from one job to the next. As Alex Boham says, "kung mahinay ang trabaho, balhin" (If work was slow, move out) (Tiu, 2006:3). Indeed, at least 41% of the respondents moved at least twice in their lifetime. Abner Papuling, for instance has worked in six places since coming in 1967, from Balut, he went to Punsad and stayed for two years, Kiamba, three years, Dumuluk, eight years, Margos, five years and back to Punsad, where he has lived since 1984. Ernesto Jumaat, on other hand, has been moving back and forth between Punsad, Tamplasa for five years, before moving to Tupi and later, Nibong. For some migrants, the onset of a family life means having a sedentary life, but for others, having a food to eat takes precedence than staying permanently in a place. Helma's four children, for example, were born in four different places as he continually seeks work.

Community Life, Clusters, and Networks

The community or cluster affiliation is a significant aspect of the Sangir-Talauds. As cited earlier, there is a tendency among the Sangir-Talauds to live in groups and among themselves. The communities or clusters in Glan, Balut and Sarangani are generally organized along origin area. The composition is more heterogeneous in other communities, perhaps because of the seasonal nature of work, such as in the case of rice mill communities. Except for a few, most of the Sangirs tend live among themselves and separate from the cluster of Filipino houses in the villages.[37]

Living in clusters is one mechanism of migrants to cope with their illegal status in Mindanao. By living together, they are able to share information and resources, as well as develop a network of friends and

relatives whom they can run for help in times of crisis or trouble. From the moment they leave their home islands to their first day in Mindanao, many of the migrants find help or assistance from their relatives and friends. Medellion Camalo for instance, traveled to Mindanao with his uncle. Upon arrival, his relatives provided accommodation and helped him find work. Employment opportunities are easily disseminated within the community. Ms. Regina Belascuarin,[38] a Filipino rice mill owner in Norallah, shares that every time they need additional workers, the Sangir-Talauds living in their compound are immediately able to find compatriots from other towns to fill in the vacancy. Information on immigration policies, surveys, and other stories spreads out easily. Respondents for this study for instance, were not difficult to find (contrary to what was expected of illegal migrants) since when Indonesian residents heard about the interviews and thinking it was a government survey, they started to turn up in the houses of local leaders. It was only later when they realized that the interview was for an academic exercise.

The Indonesian Consulate in Davao City has used the clusters as the basic organization of Indonesian communities in Mindanao. Each group of clusters, organized by municipality or city, has a designated liaison officer. They serve as the main contact person of the Consulate and in charge of disseminating information on consular activities, elections, immigration, and other issues. The liaison officer also coordinates with local government officials and the Filipino community. Pak Benny,[39] the liaison officer for Glan, has been helping the local government and Immigration satellite office in encouraging fellow migrants to register, acting sometime as interpreter, and assisting in filling up the form. Prior to his appointment in 1993, he has been working since 1968 as a caretaker of a coconut plantation. He receives a small honorarium for his work with the Consulate.

Image 4. A gathering of Sangir-Talaud youths from different parts of Southeastern Mindanao in General Santos City organized by the local church.

The social relations and networks within and among the clusters are further strengthened by local Indonesian Christian churches, which are almost always present in each of the clusters. There are very few Muslims Indonesians and most are based in Kiamba. The Indonesian Christian ministry started almost at the same time American protestant missionaries started proselytizing in Mindanao.[40] The Indonesian churches are member churches of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP). In cities like Davao and General Santos, the Indonesians share with Filipino Christians the use of UCCP churches for their worship services. The churches run literacy classes and promote the use of the Sangir language in communities. The regular youth encounters organized by local churches give young Indonesians to know one another and build linkages.

Conclusion

The geopolitical transformation of Mindanao started by the Spanish was completed by the Americans, along with the settlement and development of the area. The Americans put in place the necessary

political-legal institutions of immigration and customs to support it borders in Mindanao. Yet, the border was not fully able to seal off the area or hinder the movement of goods and people. Rather than highlight political subdivision, the border drew attention to the differences in economic opportunity and better living conditions between Mindanao and the Sangir-Talaud archipelago. The border, then, became more of a line that needs to be crossed and exploited.

Driven by drought, disease, and lack of employment, many Sangir-Talauds found their way back to Mindanao at the beginning of American settlement and colonization of the area. Unaware of their ancestors' early presence in the area, many would replant and reoccupy the areas their ancestors once trod. In turn, became the silent and undocumented "pioneer settlers" of Mindanao. They prepared the ground for succeeding movements that persisted to the postcolonial period. Many would settle permanently in Mindanao, while some continually crossed the border to maximize what is offered on both sides.

As illegal settlers in Mindanao, the Sangir –Talauds do not have access to basic services such as education. Many, thus, remained manual workers throughout their life. It seems this pattern will continue as their many young Sangir-Talauds are unschooled. In coping with their illegal and marginal position, many would depend on their relatives, friends, and kinfolk for help. A number also establish good relations with their Filipino employers and relations.

Chapter IV
Ambivalent State, Resolute Border Region: The Sangir-Talauds and the Philippine State

The politics of exclusion at the border does not only occur within the juridical construction of belongingness as embodied in the institution of citizenship. This also occurs through a discursive process of representing transgressive movements at the border as threats to the security of the state. States construct profiles of border crossers according to their country of origin. Because of such threats, states are able to justify their policies of closure and exclusion. This becomes problematic at state border regions where local communities do not necessarily share the sentiments and perspective of the center or their origin state. This chapter examines how the Philippine state has dealt with the Sangir-Talauds in Mindanao and the corresponding response of the Sangir-Talauds and host local communities. The first section explores the policies developed by the Philippines on the Sangir-Talauds. While the long historical relations with Indonesia were the basis of initial attempt to develop policies on its borders, this was superseded later by the security concerns at the border. There were two instances when the presence of the Sangir-Talauds was associated with supposed national security threats emanating from the border. The weak bases of these threats, however, failed to make a dent on the lived reality of the border. The policies implemented also did not meet its desired objectives, partly because of administrative and fiscal limitations and the challenges posed by maritime geography. The Sangir-Talauds responded to these policies through avoidance, evasion, and half-hearted compliance. The second section examines how local communities and local governments hosting the Sangir-Talauds perceived and received the policy responses of the national government. There is a disjunction between the national

agenda and popular responses at the ground thereby limiting the power of state intervention on its border regions. This illustrates that local communities and state institutions are critical actors, as well, in (re)defining border spaces.

In this chapter, the national identity of the Sangir-Talauds as Indonesians is used to refer to them. This is to avoid confusions on the term used in state policies, pronouncements, and newspaper reports.

Communists, Terrorists, and Migrants in the Periphery

After Indonesia's sovereignty was recognized by the international community in December 1949, the Philippines and Indonesia immediately established diplomatic relations and this was marked by a treaty of friendship on 21 June 1951. One of the first issues the two states had to deal was the illegal flow of goods and people at the border region of North Sulawesi and Mindanao. Both states were housing illegal entrants, although there were relatively more illegal Indonesian migrants in Mindanao than Filipinos in North Sulawesi. Recognizing the historical relations between the two states and within its border regions, the Philippines' initial policy proposal was for the legalization of Indonesian residents in the Philippines through legislation (Ramos, et.al, 1969: 80). The legislative bill introduced by then Congressman Diosdado Macapagal did not prosper. By 1954, a delegation of Philippine and Indonesian officials met in Manila to discuss the issue, particularly on the reciprocal legalization and repatriation of irregular migrants from both countries. This led to the signing of an agreement on immigration in Jakarta on 4 July 1956. The agreement came into force in 1961 after the ratification of the two states, which included the orderly legalization of residence of illegal migrants who pass the criteria set by the two states and repatriation for those who fail.

One of the significant aspects of the agreement was the system of border crossing control. Under this system, nationals of both countries residing within the designated border areas may freely enter and travel within the border areas for purposes of business, visit to relatives, religious worship or pleasure. Nationals availing of the system are issued border-crossing cards and this will be presented upon entry and exit in the border crossing stations in key islands in the border area. Border Committees were also established in each country to oversee the implementation of the agreement, as well as, to maintain the operations of the stations.

It would take a while, however before the legalization and repatriation took place. For one, the Philippines did not have accurate information on the number of Indonesian immigrants in the country and who among them should stay or be repatriated. It was estimated that there were around 6,000 Indonesians in Mindanao at that time. A series of negotiations between the countries ensued. By 1963, Indonesia started repatriating its citizens. At the end of 1965, a total of 3,225 Indonesians were repatriated.

The historical relations and amity between the Philippines and Indonesia, however, took a side step when anti-communist groups in the Philippines drew public attention to the increasing public support of then Indonesian President Sukarno for communism and preference for China and Soviet Union. Soon, the national dailies were filled with alleged threats posed by Communist Indonesia. "Ganjang Mindanao," thus exclaims one of the Philippine dailies in 1964 on the alleged plot of Sukarno to "crush" (ganjang) Mindanao after Indonesia is able to annex British Borneo (Barranco, 1964:5). It was alleged that Sukarno plan to revive the Majapahit empire and expands Indonesia's territory to include Borneo, Mindanao and eventually the whole Philippines.

The Indonesian migrants' presence in Mindanao was inextricably linked to this threat. Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal was quoted as saying: "...the illegal entry of Indonesians into the country constitutes a bigger and more immediate threat to Philippine security than the explosive situation in Vietnam" (Ramos, Djaafra, & Iljas, 1969:59). The alleged plot to annex the Philippines, according to Philippine Congressman Ramon Bagatsing, will not be done through military invasion but by infiltration and subversion (Ty, 1965:30). Bagatsing, a known staunch anti-communist advocate, further alleged this plot will be achieved through the help of Indonesian communist agents, many of whom are already in Mindanao (Ty, 1965:30) and with the collusion of Moscow-trained Indonesian embassy staff (Albert, 1965:2). Sukarno was reported to be "subtlety enlarging the Indonesian population in Mindanao to a degree to which they can eventually challenge or confront constituted Philippine authority on many matters such as labor, trade, industry, civil rights, and even dictate municipal or provincial administration" (Barranco, 1964:5). The report further said that "some Philippine officials are emasculated in their task to enforce the laws against the Indonesians because the Indonesians are good-paying tenants in the apartment houses or buildings for rent belonging to some Philippine officials" (Barranco, 1964:5).

The scenario of migrants being part or used for their home state's interests is not without basis according to congress officials and newspaper reports. Czechoslovakia's Sudentenland was easily annexed by Hitler (which Bagatsing likened to Sukarno) through the help of a large number of Germans in the area (Rama, 1965:6). Nearer to home, the Japanese invaders during the World War II knew their targets well in the Philippines supposedly because of the information gathered by highly trained Japanese intelligence officers disguised as street peddlers and poor migrants (Tutay, 1965:82). Like the Indonesians, the Japanese were very peaceful and law-abiding migrants in the Philippines. Yet, they turned up to be the opposite during the war. Therefore, given that many of the Indonesian migrants are

"card-carrying communists," according to army intelligence, (Ty, 1965:3) their role in the infiltration and subversion of Mindanao is not far-fetched. This suspicion was shared by then Davao Governor Almendras, who was quoted saying:

> "Red infiltrators can disguise themselves as plain farmers, fishermen, or traders. Who can tell whether an Indon [Indonesian] who has just landed, say, in Sarangani is a trader or a Communist propagandist? ... Their coming to the country may be for no other purpose than to look for employment. Five years ago it was their only purpose. But I do not believe it now. (Ty, 1965:4)

Aside from the security threat posed by the Indonesians, they were also deemed as carriers of diseases. Apparently, because of their ignorance and poverty, they do not practice proper hygiene and sanitation (Espino, 1952:3). The Indonesians were also taught to cause the outbreak of smallpox in Balut and Sarangani Islands in 1925. Other reports also mentioned that the Indonesians were taking away jobs from local workers and occupying lands illegally (De Gracia, 1963:4). Because of these perceived threats, calls were made to secure the border by building up a naval facility in Cotabato and the immediate repatriation of the Indonesians.

There were dissonant voices, however, in the stories peddled by anti-communist supporters, both at the national and local level. Congressman Rogaciano Mercado labeled the plot as "notorious hoax" (Ramos, Djaafra, & Iljas, 1969:63). The Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces also denied the presence of spies in Mindanao (Tupas, 1965:23). On the border island of the municipality of Sarangani, the acting Mayor at the time, Alberto Olarte, said much of what have been said about the Indonesians was fiction (Tupas, 1965:21). He said that if indeed the Indonesians are infiltrators, the country have been infiltrated for centuries.

Filipino residents in Balut and Sarangani Islands also did not view the Indonesians infiltrators or communists in the 1960s; nor were the Indonesians viewed as labor competitors or depriving the Filipinos land, based on a study of Campado (1990:88). The study also shows that the community was not aware of any Indonesian trying to propagate the communist ideology or discuss with them anything about communism (Campado, 1990:101). There were two Indonesians students allegedly who escaped to Balut the Communist persecution after Sukarno's downfall but not much was heard of them as they were described as silent and harmless (Campado, 1990:102).

The hysterics about communism and the alleged Indonesian plot to annex the Philippines has less to do with the presence of Indonesian migrants in Mindanao than the geopolitics of the time. Sukarno's preference over the communist Russia and China has visibly irked the democratic Americans. The Philippines, being the United State's loyal ally in Asia, became its primary propaganda machine to counter Sukarno's moves in the region. The Indonesian migrants in Mindanao were the most visible manifestation of the threat communist Indonesia posed to the Philippines. By bringing them in the grand conspiracy, the legislators were not only able to concretize the threat, but also played out that the threat is already within the state.

The Indonesians repeated transgressions of the border is a powerful simile to the propensity to create disturbance and subversion within the state. As the "communist others," they were fair contrasts to the democratic loving Filipinos. The problem with this narrative is that it assumes a correspondence between the Indonesian state and the people within its territory. Inter alia, by being part of the territory, one is assumed to be communist. A more nuanced look, however, at the Indonesians in Mindanao will show it was quite uncertain that the Indonesian state would have considerable influence on a community of Indonesians in the Philippines

who have been in the area prior to Indonesia's independence. Moreover, the effectiveness of the migrants as instigators and propaganda machines is fallible given the lack of education and "ignorance" supposedly of these migrants, most of which are simple farmers and fishermen.

The feebleness of this supposed security threat is shown by the abrupt end of public uproar after Sukarno's fall from presidency. The threat discourse, however, provided momentum to the negotiations between the Philippines and Indonesia on the mobility of their nationals in their common border regions. In 1974, the Philippines and Indonesia signed a new Border Crossing Agreement in Manado, Indonesia. Under the revised agreement, which came into force on 11 March 1975, the border areas were expanded and included Tawi-Tawi on the Philippine side. A border crossing station was also established in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi. Likewise, the rules for cargoes and merchant ships were also delineated.

Image 5. The Philippine Border Crossing Station in Batuganding, Sarangani Island.

While an innovative concept at the time in border control, the creation of border crossing stations was beset with financial and logistical

problems which resulted in its failure. Each station is supposed to be manned by officers from the Bureau of Customs, Immigration, Quarantine, and the Coast Guard. Because of lack of funds, it was only the Coast Guard that maintains staff in the station. Thus, the stations function more of a police patrol post rather than the multi-functions they were originally envisioned. At present only one station in each state is functioning (Batuganding Station in Balut Island and Marore Station in Sangir-Talaud area). Moreover, according to former Davao City Immigration Chief, Talib Abdulaup,[41] the physical location and the lack of efficient transportation to and from the stations make it difficult for both states to maintain and entice personnel to be assigned in the stations. Batuganding, for example, does not have electricity and communication facilities. During a visit to the Batuganding border crossing station in 2002, there was only one motorized boat for use to patrol the sea, which was not working at the time. Hence, the patrolling of the sea had to wait for some time.

It is not only the logistical requirements that made the border crossing system unfeasible. Unlike land borders where all roads presumably lead to a border checkpoint, there are no such arrangements in maritime highways. Anybody can load and unload at any points in the massive length of Mindanao coasts. It would only perhaps the highly conscientious border crosser who would go up the Batuganding border crossing station, as it is situated on a hill, to stop by en route to General Santos City and register his/her entry. Moreover, there are no significant repercussions involved by not registering with the border crossing stations. The threat of repatriation was not effective since many of those who were sent home were back the following day in Mindanao. There was a joke among local residents, for instance, that while the Philippine navy boats were busy unloading the repatriated migrants in Sangir Island, some of them hopped on nearby boats on their way back to Mindanao.

After the 1950s and 1960s events, the Indonesian migrant community in Mindanao would fade from national limelight, emerging again in the late 1990s. As part of the Bureau of Immigration's (BI) efforts to address human trafficking, irregular migration, and stateless persons in 1999, then Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez ordered a survey to determine how many of the Indonesians wanted to stay in the Philippines either as Filipino citizens or permanent residents or be repatriated. The BI considered granting citizenship or residency status to the Indonesians in Mindanao. The results of the survey showed about 54% of the Indonesian migrants wish to legalize their stay, 26% want to go home, and 17% were undecided. Commissioner Rodriguez was quoted as favoring the granting of permanent residency to the Indonesians as their presence could be easily and effectively monitored (Papa, 1999:16).

Along with the efforts to solve the status of Indonesians in Mindanao, as well as other immigrants in the country, the BI also lobbied with Congress the passage of a new immigration and naturalization law to strengthen government's action against human smugglers and irregular migrants. The proposed law includes the creation of an Immigration and Naturalization Commission that will have the power to grant Filipino citizenship to qualified applicants. Under Commonwealth Act No. 473, only the courts could decide on applications for naturalization. This has made the acquisition of citizenship in the Philippines quite tedious and costly, which ordinary immigrants may not be able to afford. Thus, the proposal extending citizenship to Indonesian migrants will not be feasible if existing laws will not be amended.

In 8 June 2001, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 9139, otherwise known as the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000". The law opened the possibility of acquiring Philippine citizenship through administrative proceedings. While it was a welcome legislation for many migrants in the country, the law however, caters more to the moneyed

migrants. The application fee for the head of family alone costs P40,000 and if the application is approved, the naturalization fee is P100,000. Add to this the fees of the dependents which totals to P60,000 per person. Citizenship was certainly a very expensive option for most of the Sangir-Talauds whose income barely covers their daily needs. Permanent temporariness is perhaps a better option. The leadership change in the BI would temporarily stall the regularization of Indonesian migrants. The plan was revived only after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack of New York City.

The ensuing global war against terrorism brought the Philippine state back to its borders with Indonesia, including Malaysia, to contain the terrorist groups lurking within the Islamic radical movements in Mindanao and across the border. Intelligence reports revealed that the Indonesian-based terror group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), has entered Mindanao and set up terrorist cells in the area ("Indon make most," 2004:A17; "BI Steps up," 2005; "Not all Jis, 2005:A2)." The porous borders of Mindanao were said to be the entry points of the terror group.

Reminiscent of the 1960s communist hysteria, it did not take long before the Indonesian migrants in Mindanao were linked with the Islamic radicals. Immigration and military officials were quoted as saying that terrorists might use the migrants in order to seek cover or elude detection. These fears were bolstered with the arrest of four Indonesians who were implicated in the bombing of Fitmart Shopping Center in General Santos City in April 2002. While recognizing the fact that many of the Indonesians have been in the area for more than fifty years and although direct links between the migrants and JI has yet to be established, government officials insisted on the "possibilities" of involvement.

Local and national officials called for the registration of Indonesian migrants to preempt terrorist infiltration and monitor the movements of JI

members. Indonesian Consul Bambang Gunawan, in an interview, vehemently denied the connection of Indonesian migrants in Mindanao with the JI ("Not all JIs," 2005). He said that the migrants are not known to be troublemakers. In a press release, he belatedly cautioned Philippine officials to be more circumspect in tagging JI as Indonesians, since according to him, it is a transnational group with members from Malaysia, Philippines and other Southeast Asian country ("Not all JIs," 2005). He further said that this kind of stereotyping is a serious concern to Indonesia and affects Indonesian businessmen and migrants in Mindanao. Despite the protestation of Indonesia, the whole registration program as discussed below was implemented as part of the anti-terror measure of the Philippine government and later as part of a four-million-Euro-project to secure the backdoor of the Philippines ("BI's top man," 2005: A6).

In November 2002, Philippine immigration agencies led a crackdown on Indonesian migrants (Rivera, 2002:A6). These crackdowns, however, were hardly felt on the ground. No house to house checks was conducted. The BI deployed field personnel and alien control officers to conduct information drives to encourage the migrants to secure registration papers and apply for the Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). The ACR is a certificate issued to foreign nationals attesting to their legal stay in the country. It serves as an official identification of migrants when dealing with government offices, enrolling in Philippine schools, or in seeking work permits. The Indonesian Consulate and some local governments assisted in the campaign. To help facilitate the registration of Indonesians, a satellite immigration office was established in Glan in 10 February 2003.

Simultaneous with these activities, the Bureau of Immigration and the Indonesian Consulate in Davao City and Embassy in Manila started to discuss the options to resolve the question on the legalization of the migrants. This came after plans to repatriate the migrants was stalled because both governments lacked funds to finance such effort. The

Indonesian Embassy also protested the plan because aside from facilitating the repatriation, they also have to deal with the resettlement of migrants, which may take time and is quite costly ("Govt eyes," 2002).

In January 2004, Commissioner Domingo was replaced by Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, who continued the registration of migrants and negotiation with the Indonesian officials. Commissioner Fernandez fine-tuned the registration process and proposed to lower the fee rate of the ACR to the Department of Justice (DOJ) so it would be more affordable for the Indonesians. In January 2005, the DOJ agreed to reduce the ACR fee to 61% lower than the normal rate for the acquisition of ACR (see Table 5). The Indonesian government appreciated the gesture of the Justice Department. To implement the registration process, Commissioner Fernandez issued Memorandum Order No. AFFJR 05-003 on 4 January 2005.

Table 5. Comparative Schedule of Rates (in Philippine Peso) for Alien Certificate of Registration

Item	Rate	
	Regular	**Indonesian**
ACR above 14 yrs	1,050	410
ACR below 14 yrs	550	210
Annual Renewal Fee	340	150

Source: Memorandum Order No. AFFJR 05-003 and schedule of immigration fees at www.immigration.gov.ph/immigration_fees.php.

In order to help the Indonesian migrants register, the Indonesian government allotted around $100,000 to pay for their registration fees but stressed that the migrants themselves will pay for the renewal fees.[42] The registration however, was limited only to a certain sector of Indonesian migrants. Under existing laws only Indonesians born in the Philippines could apply for the ACR. After the BI completes the registration of Indonesians born in the Philippines, they will assess whether they will

extend the same privilege to those born outside of the country. The Indonesian Consulate hopes that the BI will decide in favor of the remaining unregistered migrants.

In a symbolic turn-over ceremony on 1 May 2005 in Davao City, the first set of Indonesian migrants numbering to 1,730 received their ACRs from Commissioner Alipio. During the ceremony, Indonesian Charge d' Affairs Sanusi said the Indonesian government is very thankful to the Philippine government for helping their nationals legalize their stay (Allada, 2005:23). By August 2005, a total of 2,641 Indonesians were issued their ACRs. Associate Commissioner Franklin Littaua however, noted that the Indonesians have not shown considerable interest in the registration process. By 2009, there were barely 4,000 who have registered for the ACR. The BI office in Glan registered 3,125 from 2003-2008, with the biggest number of registrants in 2005 at 1,944. After which, the numbers dwindled to 512 in 2006, 174 (2007) and down to 29 by 2008.

The declining interest in the regularization program could be attributed to the location and limited number of immigration offices in Mindanao. The Immigration office in Glan, for instance, caters for migrants based in Sarangani Province. Those who are residing, for example, in Kiamba had to travel a considerable distance to register and add to it, the cost of travel. More than the accessibility of immigration offices, however, it is the accrued value of registering that plays a significant role in determining a migrant's decision to fork out the extra time and cost. There are no significant changes in their socio-political position in the community even with an ACR. Almost all have lived in Mindanao without these papers. They are hired whether or not, they have the ACRs. Most of their children do not go to school so the need for the ACR is not a necessity. Moreover, the ACR is only a temporary respite from illegality and it does not significantly change the migrant's legal status within the state. The failure to renew the ACR the following year means a migrant is back to his previous status,

illegal and undocumented. In addition, since the ACR can only be issued to Indonesians born in the Philippines, a significant portion of the migrants are excluded from the process and yet, they continue to remain in the country without fear of arrest or detention. This further dampens the enthusiasm of many local born migrants to register and be documented.

The Other Actors in the Borders

Aside from the migrants and the national governments of states, there are other actors in the border who put their claims on the border. These are the local government institutions and communities which have largely been absent in crafting national policies on the border but directly and on a daily basis interact with migrants and the border. The relative tolerance exhibited by local government units to Indonesian migrants within their jurisdictions has made the migrants' stay and integration in the community less difficult. In the case of the municipality of Glan, for instance, the Indonesians are able to access basic social services, including education and health, provided for free by the local government. Such instances of drifting into the spaces of the "citizen," blur the neat delineation of who is legal and illegal, citizen and migrant.

Similar to the 1960's incidents, the local governments and communities did not readily share the central state's association of the migrants with terrorism. Local officials from Norallah, South Cotabato and Isulan and Ezperanza, Sultan Kudarat seemed unperturbed. Isulan Mayor Ernesto Matias,[43] for instance, said that the threats posed by local secessionist groups in Mindanao are far greater than the Indonesian migrants. Esperanza Mayor Romulo Latog[44] also shared that the Indonesians are peace-loving people and have never been involved in crimes within his jurisdiction. Given their length of stay in Mindanao, many doubts how strong are the migrants' linkages with radical groups based in Indonesia, more so that almost all Indonesian migrants are Christian.

There is only a small percentage of Muslims. Again, the particularities of the migrants' origin place and religious affiliation are overlooked to drive the state's analogy of Indonesians as terrorists.

Noticeable among the LGUs is the common shared tolerance, if not lack of interest, on the Indonesian communities within their jurisdiction, partly because they have been peaceful members of the community. Many of the local officials, for instance, in Glan, from the village head to the municipal leaders, grew up with Indonesian neighbors and classmates. The lack of interest also stems from the shared perception that the Indonesian migrants are the primary concern of the BI and not the interest of the local government. Except for the municipalities of Glan and Sarangani, all of the local officials interviewed for this study from Isulan, Norallah, Esperanza, Davao, and General Santos do not have information on the number and location of Indonesians in the area. Most of the stories shared during the interviews were anecdotal. When an interview was scheduled with the Mayor of General Santos City, the whole office staff did not know where to refer the researcher. The Vice Mayor promptly told the researcher to go to the local immigration office since she does not have any knowledge on the Indonesians in the city. Mayor Latog, on the other hand, could not exactly pinpoint where the Indonesians reside in his municipality. All the local officials, however, acknowledged the contribution of the Indonesians to the local economy. Mayor Matias disclosed that many of the rice mills in his jurisdiction are dependent on Indonesian workers and many of the employers prefer they remain illegal so they do not need to pay higher wages.

The dynamics and overall scenario at the border region between the Philippines and Indonesia is set to change again with the establishment of cross-border cooperation between the municipalities of Glan, Sarangani and Jose Abad Santos [which comprise the Jose Abad Santos-Glan-Sarangani Cooperation Triangle (JAGS-CT)] with their counterparts in North

Sulawesi and the Sangir-Talaud Regencies in areas of trade, tourism, and immigration.[45] The project, which is still in its infancy, is envisioned to lead to growth area in this border region. Already, there are on-going processes of harmonizing rules and regulations affecting the movement of goods, people and services, which will facilitate among others the monitoring of cross-border migration. It is too early to define what would be ultimate outcome of the project, but if the plans will push through, one thing is certain; it will reconfigure the border region itself.

Conclusion

The representation of migrants in public discourse as harbingers of threats, disease, and insecurity is a compelling rationale for states to close its borders and exclude border crossers. This becomes problematic, however, when migrants are profiled as threats merely on the basis of their origin states. In the case of the Indonesians in Mindanao, the two major instances, they classified as threats were rooted from their being Indonesians. Perhaps, when the state talked about their local identity as Sangir-Talauds, the dissonance of being represented as communists and Islamic terrorists would have been easily revealed. Moreover, the narrative of threats finds weak footing as local communities and governments do not necessarily share the perspective of the center or the national government.

The Philippine state's policies on its border regions have been erratic, inconsistent, and reactive, such as in the case of the Indonesian settlers in Mindanao. While early efforts to settle the mobility of goods and people in its border region with Indonesia, the succeeding efforts of the state has largely been as a result of a response to a purported threat at its border. As a result, it has not truly able to find a lasting solution to the presence of Indonesians in Mindanao. Meanwhile, the Indonesians or the Sangir-Talauds continue to cross the border and enjoy whatever it could offer them.

Chapter V
A View from the Periphery: Summary and Conclusion

The border, as the manifestation and expressions of state's territoriality, has largely been studied from the perspective of the state. It has been represented as static, fixed, and the sole domain of states. The body of literature that emerged in the 1990s suggested a shift in perspective on the borders by giving voices to actors in the border other than the state. It is argued that by privileging the narratives of border regions and its inhabitants, a different understanding of the border as a zone of interactions, accommodation, and contestation comes to the fore. The lived reality at the border hardly represents what the state conceives and perceives the border to be.

This study attempted to take on this call by examining the socio-historical dynamics of the border region between the Philippines and Indonesia, while drawing analogies and lessons from other border regions in Southeast Asia. The study argued that the formation of nation-states and demarcation of territories excluded and redefined the space and place of communities at the border regions of states. The border communities, however, were active actors in this process by resisting, challenging, or manipulating the barriers imposed by the state. The study tried to address the questions: how did the construction of the modern nation-state and border redefine the dynamics and locations of people within a border region? How the barriers erected as result of nation-building were used, manipulated, contested, and challenged by people in the border region? How did such acts shape and give meaning to border spaces?

The study addressed these questions by first examining the political organization of pre-colonial polities in Southeast Asia and territoriality of the modern nation-states. The pre-colonial polities were organized based on personal relations and alliances, with influence as measure of power rather than territory. This is contrast to the modern nation-state system introduced by colonialism which organized polities according to territory. The concept of the border in pre-colonial period implied more of the extremities of kingdoms rather than as lines separating peoples and states.

Colonialism redrew the political space of Southeast Asia and established territories and states. In the process, communities at the border were separated from their kin and relations and what used to be communal spaces of interactions became sites of division between states. The postcolonial successor state reinforced this division through the institutions of immigration and citizenship. Border communities, however, resisted and challenged the imposition of boundaries by ignoring, manipulating, and maximizing what the border can offer. As such, borders in Southeast Asia remain sites of intense interactions and exchanges.

Second, the study examined in detail the dynamics of border formation through a case study of the border region of the Philippines and Indonesia, in particular, the narratives of the Sangir-Talauds whose lives traverse this border region. In the second chapter, it is shown that this border region was part of the maritime zone of the Sulu-Sulawesi area in the pre-colonial period. The polities in the area were segmented, decentralized, and fluid. While trade was a primary factor in the interconnectedness of the various kingdoms in this body of water, familial relations because of extensive intermarriages was also a significant linking element. The Sangir-Talauds were one of the groups in the subject border region of this study. They had settlements in Sarangani Island and the Davao Gulf areas of Mindanao. Being at the crossroads of competing powers and major port-polities, the Sangir-Talaud kingdoms political, economic,

and familial relations extend from Ternate to Magindanao. Family narratives and folklore suggest that the Sangir-Talaud kingdoms had very close relations with Mindanao.

Colonial projects reconfigured this political space by altering the traditional trading network through redirecting them towards the economic centers of the colony; thereby, cutting off the main thread that links the various polities in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea. The political structure was redefined through the formation of administrative territorial units. The Sangir-Talauds, therefore, will be divided between those who would be left behind in the Spanish occupied Mindanao and the Dutch-occupied Sangir-Talaud archipelago. The boundaries between the colonial powers remained porous and communities resisted the line through smuggling and piracy. The Sangir-Talauds continued to move in and out of Mindanao, albeit on a much lower scale.

The Sangir-Talauds returned to Mindanao beginning in 1900 as discussed in the third chapter. This time, however, their entry was defined according to the political and juridical requirements of the state. Without the required documents, they were classified as illegals and therefore, with no corresponding rights. Drought, natural disasters, and limitations of employment options prompted many Sangir-Talauds to cross the border and find a living in Mindanao. The border between the Philippines and Indonesia signified not only as a political demarcation but also as a line of division between better opportunities and the absence of it. The first set of migrants in the 1900s took part in the settlement of Mindanao under the American colonial government. Their stories, however, will be faintly heard and documented. Many early settlers, as well as, those who followed later built their lives in Mindanao and considered it as their home.

Others, however, would crisscross the border as they reaped the benefits of both sides of this border region. The shuttle traders and

migrants redefined the border as site of control as they move back and forth to exploit the differences in price of goods and educational opportunities in Mindanao. The ease in the mobility of both settlers and shuttle migrants to Mindanao puts into question whether there a border exists at all between the Philippines and Indonesia.

The state may be absent in the border but its power to exclude through the institution of citizenship that assigns illegal settlers to a life of with no rights and privileges. The study shows, however, again that the Sangir-Talauds are not passive recipient of this process. Through the effective use of collective support systems, such as family and social networks, they are able to overcome the limitations imposed by illegality. The tacit and subtle support provided by host local Filipino communities and governments also made their integration in Mindanao much easier.

Exclusion also takes shape in the construction of migrants as threats to the security of the state. The problem with this construct is that migrants are profiled based on their origin state and glosses over the complexities, variety, and nuances of communities within a given state. In the border, these complexities become more real as border communities often do not share the persuasions or interest of the center. This is particularly true for those lives depend on the other side of the border. In the case of the Sangir-Talauds, they have been represented in public discourse as communists and terrorists primarily because they came from Indonesia, which is deemed as source of such threats. As shown in chapter five, the possibility of these migrants as communists and terrorists is quite remote since many have spent their lives in Mindanao and connection with their 'home' state is weak. To associate Islamic fundamentalism with a Christian community, as in the case of Sangir-Talauds, for example, is quite ridiculous.

The policy responses of the postcolonial Philippine state on the Sangir-Talauds have failed in part, because of administrative and financial limitations, as well as the challenges imposed by maritime geography. The state's inconsistency in implementing the policies also doomed its effectiveness. As expected, the responses of Sangir-Talauds settlers towards these policies have also been inconsistent and erratic. Many continue with their everyday living without due regard to the existing policies.

In conclusion, the study has shown that the formation of nation-states and imposition of borders has redefined the place of communities at the border regions as they become members of different states, with differing economies and politics. This does not mean, however, that the socio-historical dynamics have been completely altered. Border communities defied the lines of separation by continuing on with their lives, maintaining linkages across the border, and manipulate whatever benefits that both sides offer. The pre-colonial practices of mobility and exchange at the border region continue to exist, albeit, has evolved into different forms.

Borders serve more as zone of exchange, accommodation, and interactions than as sites of closure and control. People in the border make use of the opportunities it offers and build their lives and histories around it. The state, therefore, becomes only one of the actors who compete for its space and place in the border. In some instances, the state is even absent in the border further giving credence to the artificiality of the border.

As local governments at the border regions of Indonesia and the Philippines begin to redefine the border spaces separating them through cross-border cooperation and creation of a borderless economic zone, the notion of bounded collectivities will be further put to test.

Notes

Chapter I

1. This is a slightly revised version of Horstmann's earlier paper published in Antropologi Indonesia (2002).
2. Under the NEP, the educational and socio-economic condition of a large number of Malaysians significantly improved and many of which favored work in modern industries.
3. Shaari bin Baba's study shows that according to police sources, between 1983 and 2005 crimes committed by foreign workers hardly exceeded three percent of all crimes committed annually and that there was little evidence to show that foreign workers are responsible for rising crime rate (as quoted in (Mak, 2006:16).

Chapter II

4. The territorial boundaries between Indonesia and the Philippines were based on the 1898 Treaty of Paris when Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States. The boundary between North Borneo and the Philippines were fixed in a treaty between Great Britain and the United States in 1930. The Philippines and Indonesia have yet to formally agree on the delimitation of their maritime boundaries based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
5. Politically, the two islands comprise the municipality of Sarangani under the province of Davao Del Sur. The municipality is not part of and should not be confused with the Province of Sarangani.
6. In local practice and in this study as well, Sangir is used interchangeably with Sangihe.
7. VOC stands for Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (United East India Company), while TANAP means Towards a New Age for Partnership. TANAP is a joint initiative of institutions based in Netherlands and the country's former colonies to promote, among others, research and archival studies on the yet unstudied voluminous VOC records. For more information on the program, visit: http://www.tanap.net/.
8. From the Arabic word *silsilah* which means chain or link (Saleeby, 1976:1).
9. These scholars are: Alex Ulaen, who is from Talaud Island and works with the Sam Ratulangi University in Manado; Domingo Non, a local historian based at the Mindanao State University, General Santos City; and Shinzo Hayase, a Japanese professor at Osaka City University, who has written extensively on the history of Davao and Southern Mindanao.
10. Hayase (2007) mentioned in his work that the *tarsilas* are currently being used to resolve territorial dispute in the Sangir-Talaud Islands (94). This is quite problematic since the genealogies were not written to identify "territories" but mainly for tracing lineage of families who might be located in different places. As the succeeding discussion will show the concept of territory was quite far from the minds of the early settlers in the Sulu-Sulawesi maritime zone. The genealogies merely identity where family members are located but do not imply territorial ownership or property rights.
11. The boat makers of Nanusa Island in the Talaud area are said to export boats to Sangir, North Sulawesi, and Ternate (Henley, 2005:81; Forrest, 1971:324). The tradition of boat building in Sangir continues up to present, albeit the design have changed considerably from what has Forrest observed during his visit (Ulaen, 2003:136). In terms of knowledge of the sea, Lapian notes, for instance, that the Sangirese would have at least eighteen terms for wind types (Lapian, 2008:16).

12. The area where the Sultanate of Magindanao was located in pre-colonial Sulu-Sulawesi world is now the present Cotabato City. It should be not be confused with the Magindanao ethnic group and the present Province of Magindanao.
13. Spain abandoned Zamboanga in 1663 because of the Koxinga threat to Manila. According to Majul, for the next fifty years, Spain did not appear in Muslim Mindanao in any military capacity (1973:166).
14. The use of the name "Cotabato" in this legend suggests that it might have been revised by natives of the Sangir Island, perhaps to conform to the modern name of what used to be the powerful Sultanate of Magindanao. The name Cotabato came into use only after 1861 when the Spanish colonial government created the politico-military government of Mindanao and Sulu. Saleeby notes that the present Cotabato City covers the former settlements of Magindanao and Slangan (1976:3).
15. There are several versions of this legend (at least five in Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999) perhaps because of the process of oral transmission from one generation to another.
16. The date of Panurat's entry is quite problematic since presumably, he is Muslim because of his knowledge in Arabic, but Islam did not arrive in Sangir until the 15th century based on the two points of references on the history of Islam in the area, Magindanao and Ternate. Islam was introduced in Magindanao in early 15th century, while it would reach Ternate on the last quarter of the century.
17. Another story relates that the name Sarangani came from Saranganing, a Sangir voyager who traded with the kingdom of Buayan in earlier times.
18. The burial site of *Datu* Panurat can still be seen today beside ARCAL's garage at Batuganding Point, Sarangani Island. An aged Kalachuci tree marks the site, which is a traditional burial sign for the communities in the Sangir-Talaud Islands. This practice it seems is not unique to Sangirese. Saleeby mentioned a similar practice in Magindano where trees are often planted around the tomb. During the fieldwork in Balut Island in 2002, Sangir residents mentioned such trees around tombs of early migrants.
19. According to Laarhoven, in some Dutch and Spanish maps, Sarangani is mistaken as Kandahar because the island is home to the King of Kandahar (1989:233).
20. In another narrative, Mehelangi is the son of Syarif Maulana II who married Pedima, a princess from Mindanao (Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999). He married Princess Bembulaeng of Kendahe and became Rajah of Kendahe. He was succeeded by Raja Buisang.
21. See for instance the genealogies from page 44-56 in Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999.
22. Majul said the Barhaman was heard as Sultan as early as 1678 and died on 6 July 1699 based on Dutch sources (1973:29).
23. Hayase erred in his 2007 work when he interpreted these spheres of influence as five layers of territorial concepts of Magindanao (2007:61-64). As evident in the discussion, the modern concept of territory was far from the minds of Magindanao rulers, even the famous Sultan Qudarat. According to Laarhoven, after Qudarat took control of the Davao Gulf region, the embattled *Datu* Buisan continued to rule in the area. This arrangement is 'ambiguous', as argued by Hayase (2007:67), that is, if it is perceived from the modern notions of territory and state.
24. Forrest records a similar account; Makalindi's name is noted as Maholanding (1971:252). Makalindi's title as first Sultan of Sangir, however, is quite problematic. Sangir never developed into a full Sultanate. There never was a single unified Sangir kingdom because of internal division and fierce competitions among the kingdoms in the area. It could have been that in order to make the marriage look more prestigious, it was recorded as a marriage between two Sultanates. Barhaman might have married the sister of the gugugu of the King of Tabukan as reported in Laarhoven's work.

In the genealogy of *Datu* of Pangyan, Glan, Sarangani Province, Basing's father is listed as Sultan Mohammad Tacumang of Lumaog, Tawokang, Indonesia. Instead of Basing, the genealogy uses the name Umbaseng. There is some error in the date in this genealogy. It said that Basing's parents married in 1675, when this is the year Basing married Barhaman. In Hayase's 2007 work, he noted that it was the year Basing's parents moved to Glan. Morever, the story of Basing's siblings contradicts the story in the Magindanao geneaology which states that her brother was a Rajah in Sangir. In the Glan genealogy, her siblings were based in Glan (the eldest, Sarael), Balut Island and Tuguisa, Kiamba. Sarael's children spread out, perhaps after marriage, to Madawong (Davao del Norte), Jose Abad Santos, Batulaki (Glan), and Lumawog (Tawokang, Indonesia). At least two in succeeding generations would intermarry with women of Magindanaon ancestry.The current *datu*, *Datu* of Pangyan, Mastura Salisipan, who is the source for this genealogy, is of Sangil ancestry and traces their origin to Ternate, Sangir Island, Lumaog, Rumban, and Lerong, Indonesia. Non notes that it was *Datu* Mastura who assisted in securing some of the genealogies (Hayase, Non, & Ulaen, 1999:46).

Chapter III

25. In an interview in 15 April 2002, Rosiana, one of the daughters of Benjamin Mahaling, recounted that their family came in August 1918. Being 11 years old at the time, she could not remember the particularities of their move.
26. Interviewed on 17 April 2002 in Laker, Balut Island.
27. In Macario Tiu's work (2006), he mentioned about Rosa de Arce vda de Parsaso, daughter of Venancio de Arce, having an Indonesian stepmother.
28. Interview with Dr. Tranquilino Ruiz, Gen. Santos City, 16 June 2009.
29. Interviewed on 25 April 2002, General Santos City.
30. Interviewed on 18 April 2002, Patirang, Balut Island.
31. The Palmas Island, as referred to in the Philippines or Pulau Miangas in Indonesia, is the nearest island off the Indonesian border with southeastern Mindanao. It is situated approximately 47 nautical miles east-northeast of Sarangani Island and 78 nautical miles to one of Mindanao's key cities, Davao. Miangas lies about 75 nautical miles from Tahuna Regency, which has political administrative jurisdiction over the island, and about 324 miles from Manado. A boat trip from Palmas Island to Cape San Agustin, Davao del Norte takes about three hours, while it is a three-day trip to reach the Manado aboard a passenger ferry that plies the route every fortnight (Velasco, 2007:7). While sovereignty over Palmas Island was awarded to Indonesia in 1925 after a landmark arbitration proceeding between then colonial powers in the area, the United States and Netherlands, it remains to be a subject of dispute between the two successor states, the Philippines and Indonesia, respectively.
32. Interviewed on 20 April 2002, Glan.
33. Interviewed on 10 June 2009 in Samal Island, Davao.
34. The conversion rate used: A$1=P40.
35. At the time of the survey, there were only a few families at home, thus the small number of respondents. According to local informants, Gen. Santos City has one of the biggest communities of migrants.
36. Interviewed on 17 June 2009, Mindanao State University, Gen. Santos City.
37. In an informal discussion with Alex Ulaen in July 2003, he observed that even in Manado, Sangirs tend to live in clusters separate from the local community and outside of the city.
38. Interviewed on 18 May 2005, Norallah, South Cotabato.
39. Interviewed on 15 May 2005 and 16 June 2009.
40. According to Valentin Sitoy (1981:147-175), the first phase of American protestant missionary work in the Philippines was spearheaded by the

Christian Missionary Alliance (CMA) in 1900 in Sulu and Zamboanga. The missionary work in the Davao Gulf areas occurred between 1903 and 1915. Some of the Sangir-Talaud residents are CMA members.

Chapter IV

41. Interviewed on 15 September 2000, Davao City.
42. Based on an interview with Consul Bambang Gunawan on 16 May 2005 at the Indonesian Consulate, Davao City.
43. Interviewed on 18 May 2005, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat.
44. Interviewed on 18 May 2005, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat.
45. For more information, see varied reports on the websites of the Mindanao Economic Development Council (www.medco.gov.ph/) and the provincial government of Sarangani (www.sarangani.gov.ph/).

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